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Abstract
Chapter 1: A large body of the corporate finance literature is devoted to capital structure. This literature
examines whether firms have a target capital structure, and whether they actively rebalance their capital
structure towards a target. Conversion of a convertible bond causes a drop in leverage, which target capital
structure theory suggests should be rebalanced in the future. Consistently, evidence is provided that following
a realized conversion, firms rebalance their positions in less than a year. When the stock price passes the
conversion price threshold for a convertible bond, the firm expects this drop in leverage to occur in the near
future. Using a regression discontinuity design around the conversion price threshold, for those conversions
that are decided by investors, not by the firm it is documented that a 21% increase in leverage before an
actual drop in leverage. That is to say, firms do not wait for the realization of leverage shocks, but rather
respond to anticipated shocks. A quantile treatment effect analysis reveals the effect to be a hump-shaped
function of leverage, with a peak for firms with a conditional leverage ratio around the 70th percentile.
Chapter 2: This chapter provides a theory of collusion under demand uncertainty by cartels of countries
such as OPEC that do not care directly about profits, per se, but rather the utility derived by their risk
averse citizens who receive those profits; and who face positive fixed operating costs. The chapter provides
conditions under which it is most difficult for cartel members to collusively restrict output when demand is
especially low, but it also becomes difficult to support collusion when demand is very high, showing both
that cartel members must be risk averse and operating costs must be positive. Further it is established that
when cartel members are more risk averse or fixed operating costs are higher, then it becomes more difficult
to support collusion in bad demand states, but easier in booms.
Chapter 3: The last chapter presents a model of a public pension fund’s choice of portfolio risk. Optimal
portfolio allocations are derived when pension fund management maximize the utility of wealth of a rep-
resentative taxpayer or when pension fund management maximize their own utility of compensation. The
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model’s implications are examined using annual data on the portfolio allocations and plan characteristics of
125 state pension funds over the 2000 to 2009 period. Consistent with agency behavior by public pension
fund management, evidence is provided that funds chose greater overall asset – liability portfolio risk fol-
lowing periods of relatively poor investment performance. In addition, pension plans that select a relatively
high rate with which to discount their liabilities tend to choose riskier portfolios. Moreover, consistent with
a desire to gamble for higher benefits, pension plans take more risk when they have greater representation
by plan participants on their Boards of Trustees.
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Chapter 1
Capital Structure Pre-Balancing
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I study the capital structure decisions of firms that have issued convertible bonds, whose stock
price is close to the conversion price thresholds at which bondholders can exchange the bond for equity.
From the perspective of the firm, these decisions by bondholders act as exogenous shocks to their capital
structure, altering the debt-equity composition, instantaneously reducing leverage by significant amounts.
Target capital structure theory would suggest that firms should respond to such shocks by rebalancing. My
paper investigates how firms respond in practice. In doing so, I answer a set of questions: How fully do
firms respond to what are effectively exogenous shocks to their capital structure by re-establishing their
original capital structure? What is the timing of firm responses? How quickly do firms rebalance their
capital structures in response to exogenous changes to their capital structure? Do firms anticipate likely
future changes to their capital structure, by preemptively beginning to rebalance prior to the actual shocks
to their capital structure? In other words, does a firm’s management passively wait until a change actually
occurs, or does it respond preemptively when the current stock price suggests that future changes are likely?
Previous research has focused on capital structure decisions in response to realized deviations from target
levels. The literature has largely ignored the real-time capital structure decisions that firms must make as a
function of anticipated likely changes in capital structure. This is partially due to the fact that it is typically
hard to quantify anticipated changes in capital structure. More importantly, given that capital structure
compositions is a choice variable and therefore an internal decision to the firm, finding a clear answer to these
questions requires an exogenous source of variation in capital structure, a feature that has been completely
ignored by prior studies. That is, one needs to distinguish the effect of capital structure from the effects of
other firm characteristics that influenced the actual capital structure choice. The goal of this paper is to
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exploit the discrete changes in capital structure caused by conversion features of convertible bonds to answer
these questions.
Static trade-off theory hypothesizes that firms identify an optimal target for their composition of debt
and equity to balance financial distress and agency costs (of the conflict between lenders and shareholders)
of debt to its tax benefits. Empirical evidence of the relevance of target capital structure theory is mixed.
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995),Graham (1996) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) provide
evidence of an association between leverage and firm characteristics consistent with a target capital structure.
Moreover, Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Auerbach (1985), Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Faulkender et al.
(2011) provide evidence consistent with firms actively rebalancing their capital structure toward a target.
Conversely, the negative association between past profitability and the leverage ratio is widely presented as
evidence against trade-off theory(Hovakimian et al. (2001)). In addition, inconsistent with the target capital
structure hypothesis, studies have documented that changes in capital structure are mainly the result of
internal financing deficits (Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999)), historical stock returns (Welch (2004)), or
management attempts to time the market (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). A possible reason for why these
studies have had mixed results is lack of identification strategy which makes it really hard to measure the
causal impact of leverage deviations from the target on future financing decisions of the firm.
The conversion option of convertible bonds provides a unique opportunity to study the empirical relevance
of target capital structure hypothesis by examining how the financing decisions of firms respond to both
realized and anticipated changes in capital structure. Bondholders find it optimal to convert their bonds
into equity only after the stock price passes a predetermined threshold (the conversion price). Conversion
causes an instant drop in the leverage ratio, a drop that is exogenous from the perspective of the firm.
Likewise, the “expected leverage” ratio falls as the share price rises, approaching the conversion threshold.
I search for evidence that the conversion threshold serves as a trigger for firms, inducing them to change
capital structure when the stock price hits the threshold. I design my tests so that conversions and anticipated
conversions, detected by the conversion option becoming in the money, can be seen as treatment. Following
Lee (2008) I argue that around the conversion threshold, the assignment of treatment is close to a random
assignment. This provides a quasi-experimental design to study the effect of changes in anticipated leverage
ratio on financing decisions.
Two facts make this opportunity a credible framework for investigating target capital structure theories.
First, as Stein (1992) points out convertible bonds are an important source of financing for many firms.
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Essig (1991) provides evidence that more than 10% of all COMPUSTAT companies had at least one-third
of their total debt in the form of convertible debt in the period 1963-1984. Second, voluntary conversions
(i.e., conversion that are decided by the bondholder and not by the firm) cause significant changes in capital
structure. As I document below the median size of a voluntary conversion shock is approximately 7.3%
relative to total debt. Therefore, capital structure consequences of a conversion are both frequent and
sizeable.
While theory provides a variety of explanations for why firms issue convertible bonds, it seems less
clear that theory predicts how capital structure responds to a conversion. The presence of the conversion
option is rationalized by its ability to mitigate the underinvestment problem caused by “risk-shifting” (Green
(1984)), avoiding adverse-selection costs associated with direct equity issuance when shares are undervalued
(Stein (1992)), and controlling over-investment or free cash flow problems (Jensen (1986)) by matching firm’s
financing and investment options (Mayers (1998)). Contrary to others, Mayers (1998) provides insights into
firm’s investment and financing behavior at conversion. He predicts that a drop in the leverage ratio due to a
conversion would free up debt capacity. If firms use this new capacity to raise new debt to finance investment
options, consistent with rebalancing theory, this would cause leverage ratio to bounce back quickly. However,
his empirical evidence–that both debt and equity issuances increase after conversion–makes it ambiguous
as to what the direction is. This calls for a clean empirical analysis to identify the direction of financing
decision in response to capital structure changes.
To study the link between changes in capital structure and financing policy, one needs to address the
endogeneity of capital structure. Without that, one may wonder whether the effect comes from changes in
capital structure per se or from common underlying factors that determine the choice of capital structure. To
alleviate this concern, I exploit the discrete changes in capital structure around the conversion threshold. In
particular, the discontinuity in leverage due to conversion feature of convertible bonds enables me to employ a
regression discontinuity design as an empirical strategy to identify the impact of anticipated leverage changes
on capital structure decisions. The quasi-experimental set-up in regression discontinuity design provides a
clean experiment in which changes in capital structure around the conversion threshold can be considered
as exogenous. This approach allows me to compare otherwise similar firms, for which the stock [roce is just
below (above) the conversion price threshold and therefore conversion option is out of (in) the money. This
comparison sheds light on how an anticipated change in capital structure (due to the conversion option being
in the money) affects financing policy of firms.
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I also examine firms’ financing responses to a realized change in capital structure, by comparing their
behavior before and after a realized conversion to the behavior of a group of similar firms that did not
experience a conversion in that period. More specifically, I use a difference-in-difference approach for the
changes in the leverage ratios before and after conversions. To do this, I use a group of firm-quarter
observations with a voluntary conversion as the treatment group. Perhaps the closest control group to
the treatment group is the group of firm-quarter observations with outstanding convertible bonds that
eventually have a conversion. I restrict the treatment to only voluntary conversions so that the resulting
drop in leverage is as exogenous to the firm as possible. To explore leverage dynamics following a conversion,
I continue comparing the leverage ratio between the two groups during the periods following a conversion
up to a point when the effect disappears.
My first finding shows that a realized conversion on average reduces leverage of about 4.5% , which is more
than 12% with respect to average capital structure. This finding is robust to the inclusion of conventional
leverage control variables as well as year and quarter fixed effects in the model specification. Further,
nearly identical results are obtained by either expanding the control group to the universe of all convertible
bond issuers, or by restricting the experiment to a subset of more exogenous conversions (i.e., that occur
during the hard call protection period). Although conversion creates a mechanical drop in the leverage ratio,
documenting the economic significance of this relationship is a pre-requisite for the subsequent analysis.
I next show that following a realized conversion, firm rebalance their position in less than a year. This
evidence is consistent with the trade-off theory’s prediction that firms actively rebalance their capital struc-
ture in response to deviations from the target level. What distinguishes my finding from prior studies is
that in line with Graham and Leary (2011)’s suggestion. I locate a source of variation in capital structure
outside the partial adjustment model (Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Auerbach (1985), Flannery and Rangan
(2006), Faulkender et al. (2011)). In addition, compared to other papers using variations outside the partial
adjustment model (e.g, Harford et al. (2009), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Alti
(2006) and Hovakimian et al. (2001)) I use an arguably exogenous source of change in capital structure, i.e.,
voluntary conversion of convertible bonds by investors and not by the firm. This enables me to pin down
the causal effect of capital structure changes on financing policy.
I also find strong evidence that firms actively “pre-balance”. Using a regression discontinuity design to
compare firms with convertible bonds for which the conversion option is in the money vs. out of the money,
I find that firms increase their leverage even before a realization of the drop in leverage. More specifically,
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I find that the book value of long term debt rises as soon as the stock price crosses conversion threshold by
approximately 7.4% of assets –a 21% increase with respect to the average leverage level before passing the
threshold. To use the entire sample, I control for the potential information contained in stock price distance
to conversion threshold by a polynomial in this distance, labelled as conversion premium. This result is
robust to the inclusion of control variables including conventional leverage controls, as well as firm, year
and quarter fixed effects. Both parametric and non-parametric analysis indicate that pre-balancing begins
a quarter before the stock price passes the conversion threshold and continues until a quarter afterwards.
These findings suggest highly active capital structure management in response to deviations from target
capital structures.
Finally, I show that the degree of pre-balancing varies as a function of the leverage level. A quantile
treatment effect (QTE) analysis indicates that pre-balancing is a hump-shaped function of leverage ratio.
More specifically, firms with extremely high or low conditional leverage levels pre-balance by increasing
leverage levels by 3% to 5%; but this number surges up to 13% for firms that are moderately levered.
My primary contribution to the capital structure literature is to provide evidence in support of capital
structure rebalancing in response to an exogenous variation in capital structure. My paper is the first to show
that re-balancing may begin even before the realization of a change in capital structure. Using conversion
feature of convertible bonds, I propose a novel method to track anticipations of future changes in capital
structure. My paper also relates to literature explaining the rationale behind issuing convertible bonds. In
particular, my finding is consistent with Mayers (1998)’s theory of staged financing, predicting an increase
in debt financing and investment activities around conversion time.
My findings for variation of pre-balancing in low and middle quantiles of the leverage ratio may also be
interpreted as a counter example to debt overhang (Myers (1977), Lang et al. (1996), Hennessy (2004)). Debt
overhang hypothesis would predict the pre-balancing to be a decreasing function in leverage. In contrast,
QTE analysis shows that pre-balancing is increasing in leverage for a wide range of conditional leverage
levels, i.e. from the 5th to about the 70th. Only in high leverage quantiles (above the 70th quantile), do I
find a decreasing pre-balancing function in leverage. Thus, debt overhang hypothesis seems to be relevant
only for highly-levered firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses data and sample construction.
Section 1.3 presents the theoretical motivation for the study by outlining how a conversion affect capital
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structure and what theory predicts about the response of financing decision to such changes. Section 1.4
presents the results of the analysis investigating capital structure response to a realized conversion. In section
1.5 I provide evidence for pre-balancing using regression discontinuity design analysis. Section 1.6 concludes
the paper and proposes a number of questions for future research.
1.2 Data and Sample Selection
1.2.1 Convertible Bond Data
The convertible bond information used in this study comes from the Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD), in which the basic unit of observation is a bond issue. Given that firms typically have multiple
issues outstanding at the same time, I exploit the dataset to aggregate information on all bonds that are
issued by the same issuers. FISD provides general information on bond characteristics such as issue date,
issue amount, yield and maturity as well as information that is more specific to convertible bonds. This
includes the beginning and ending dates of the conversion option, conversion price, conversion premium (a
distance measure between conversion price and current market price of the underlying commodity that the
bond is converted to), the level of protection against calls by the firm management, and the relative size of
each issue with respect to the underlying commodity. Moreover, FISD records the history of events (called
“actions” in FISD terminology) per each issue. Examples of such events are conversions, calls, exchanges,
new offerings, etc. Table 1.11 provides a complete list of those events along with the frequency of such
events in convertible bonds sample. For any typical event, FISD reports the following information: the
effective date of the event, the event amount (for example the amount that is converted) and the remaining
outstanding balance of the issue. Although bond characteristics have been available in FISD since the 19th
century, the fact that event history data is fairly limited before 1995, forces us to focus our attention on the
sample of convertible bonds with event dates between 1995 and 2010.
1.2.2 Sample Construction
I begin with all 4,269 convertible bond issues in FISD issued between 1967 and 2010, where 1967 is the
earliest year for which convertible bond data is available in FISD. First, I drop issues lacking conversion
price or conversion date information and exclude financial issuers (SIC codes 6000-6999). This results in
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a sample size of 3,347 issues. Second, I match frequency of observations across datasets. Events for each
issue in FISD are available at daily frequencies. However, given that the highest frequency accounting data
available from COMPUSTAT is quarterly, I aggregate the issue-event data, into issue-quarter levels so that
data frequencies are harmonized between the two sources. This procedure aggregates 13,096 total daily events
into 12,940 quarterly events (or 11,204 events after exclusion of events for financial firms). This indicates
there are 156 multiple events in quarters in my sample. For example for the case of conversion events, there
are 56 multiple conversions for an issue with more than one conversion in the same quarter. Aggregating
multiple conversions for a single issue to quarterly basis makes a sample of 436 quarter-conversions. These
issue conversions correspond to 318 issuer firms between 1986 and 2010.
Among the events affecting capital structure listed in Table 1.1, I focus on conversions. A (voluntary)
conversion is a type of event that is not initiated or planned by the firm and therefore can be considered
as a treatment chosen outside a management’s jurisdiction. Table 1.1 shows 428 cases recorded in FISD of
conversions not initiated by the firm. Conversions that are the result of decisions by the firms , e.g., calls, are
more numerous (total of 1088 calls), but they are less appealing for identification purposes. More importantly
the table shows that conversion shocks are sizeable with a median of about $40 million. The right panel of
this table shows that relative to the size of equity the value of converted securities in a conversion shock
is on average about 7.4%, the second largest shock in this table. Lastly, notice that almost all convertible
bond issues are either converted or called before they mature. The last row of Table 1.1 shows that among
the total of 2,097 events recorded in this table, only 9 of them are related to the final maturity of an issue.
Amount (M$) Amount as Fraction of Equity
Event N Mean Median (SD) N Mean Median (SD)
Issue Converted 428 91.35 39.64 (140.88) 296 7.39 2.00 (14.37
Balance of Issue Called 331 85.62 34.84 (125.98) 153 4.58 1.40 (8.06)
Entire Issue Called 664 200.44 105.96 (242.46) 235 8.29 5.93 (8.62)
Part of an Issue Called 93 87.55 13.96 (182.42) 50 3.38 1.61 (3.79)
Issue Repurchased 572 110.72 36.67 (196.22) 471 2.76 1.41 (3.60)
Issue Matured 9 102.40 99.57 (113.74) 8 0.36 0.32 (0.24)
Table 1.1: Summary of shocks to capital structure: The table presents a summarized list of events affecting capital
structure for a bond issue in FISD between 1995 and 2010.
To ensure that conversion is not driven by a merger or acquisition, I match the resulting FISD sample to
the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) dataset and exclude 17 issuers that were the target of a merger or
acquisition deal between 1980 and 2010. Similarly, to make sure that conversions are not driven by a call due
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to an IPO, I drop 7 observations with an IPO-clawback 1 provision. To measure the pure effect of conversion
–and no other treatment, I also require that no other event listed in table 1.11 happens in the same quarter
in which conversion occurs2. This includes events which affect capital structure such as conversion-forcing
calls and repurchase. The resulting sample is 307 conversion events for 217 issuer firms between 1985 and
2008 (a total of 3,657 issues for all events). Next, I move from issue-quarter units to firm-quarter units by
aggregating observations across multiple issues outstanding for a single firm. Similar to Mayers (1998), I
calculate the sum of event-amounts for each event-quarter across different issues outstanding for each firm.
For example, if a firm experiences X dollar conversions on a 5-year bond issue and Y dollar conversion on a
10-year bond issue during the same quarter, I consider X + Y as the total conversion in that quarter. This
results in 275 firm-quarter observation corresponding to 183 firms, a total of 1,362 firms for all events.
Finally, I match the resulting dataset to quarterly accounting data from COMPUSTAT. The reason for
using quarterly data, the highest frequency in COMPUSTAT, is to get as close as possible to the event dates
in FISD, so that I can generate the most accurate estimate for the impact of a conversion. This reduces
the size of the conversion sample to 204 firm-quarter observations for 129 firms. I then draw treatment and
control samples for each of the first and second sections of the paper, the realized and anticipated conversion
analysis, as follows. For the former the treatment group contains firm-quarter observations in which only
a conversion event and no other event is recorded. To show robustness of results for the first experiment,
I use three different control groups : (a) all convertible bond issuers in quarters that did not experience a
conversion, (b) firm-quarter observations for those convertible issuers who eventually experience a conversion
but not in the current quarter, and (c) a subset of group (b), conversions happening during the hard call
protection period. Conditioning my second and third control groups on having a conversion eventually in
the future, controls for potential unobservable factors affecting taking the treatment, i.e., voluntary conver-
sion by the bond holders. To make sure I measure the pure effect of treatment, I put a four-quarter and
one-quarter cushions of no event around both treatment and control quarters. The final treatment sample
contains 145 firm-quarter observations for 103 firms. For the second experiment, the treatment group con-
tains firm-quarter observation in which (1) there is a convertible bond outstanding, (2) which eventually
will be converted in the future (but not yet), and (3) for which the stock price passed the conversion price.
1The IPO-clawback option exists when the issuer has the right to call the issue with the proceeds of an initial or subsequent
stock offering
2Except for the “Review” event which is used when FISD staff review an issue that did not experience any event in that
time period
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The control group here is identical to the treatment group, except for condition (3) which is reversed: stock
price did not reach the conversion price threshold. This results in a treatment (control) group containing
203 (283) firm-quarter observations for 48 (40) firms.
Selection
Given that sample construction is not a random procedure, potential selection concerns may limit my ability
to generalize or infer beyond my sample. However, Tables 1.2 and 1.3 address this concern by comparing the
universe of non-financial firms in COMPUSTAT and FISD during the same years to my sample. To limit
the effect of outlier, I trim COMPUSTAT ratios at upper and lower 5% and all and other samples at 1%.
Table 1.2 shows that while convertible and conversion samples are fairly similar to COMPUSTAT in terms
of profitability, tangibility and investment to capital ratio, they differ along other dimensions. In particular,
consistent with Essig (1991), the conversion sample contains firms with higher leverage levels, higher market
to book ratio and larger cash flow volatility. Stein (1992) interprets these findings as evidence of a higher
cost of financial distress for convertible bond issuers. Moreover, Table 1.2 also shows that firms in the
conversion sample are relatively larger, have higher cash flow ratio and are more likely to pay dividends than
the COMPUSTAT sample. Comparing conversion to convertible sample in the same table, shows that those
convertible issuers who experience a conversion are more likely to be larger, have better growth opportunities
as measured by market to book ratio (similar to Lewis et al. (1999)), have higher cash flow volatility and
have more tangible assets.
Similarly, Table 1.3 reflects the differences of characteristics of bond issues in the convertible sample,
the conversion sample and all bonds in the FISD universe. We Immediately see sharp differences in the
convertible bond sample relative to other bonds: convertible bonds on average have longer maturity, (over
13 years compared to about 8 years for the FISD sample), as a premium for the conversion option, have a
lower yield rate and are issued in larger amounts. However, the convertible sample and its sub-sample of
bonds that experienced a voluntary conversion (conversion sample) are quite similar in many dimensions.
Perhaps the main difference between the two samples are: (i) in the convertible sample the majority of bonds
become immediately convertible after issuance, whereas in conversion sample there is at least a 9-month delay
for the majority of the sample; and (ii) the convertible period is shorter in the conversion sample. Thus with
the exception of these two dimensions, convertible and conversion samples which constitute the treatment
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COMPUSTAT Sample Convertibles Sample Conversions Sample
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Variable [Median] [Median] [Median]
Book Leverage 0.26 (0.22) 0.28 (0.22) 0.33 (0.22)
[0.28] [0.26] [0.33]
Market Leverage 0.25 (0.17) 0.25 (0.22) 0.24 (0.21)
[0.25] [0.2] [0.2]
Log(Assets) 5.46 (5.41) 6.81 (1.89) 7.37 (1.96)
[2.24] [6.8] [7.52]
Market to Book 1.87 (1.49) 1.97 (1.3) 2.41 (1.43)
[1.11] [1.54] [1.96]
Profitability 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05)
[0.06] [0.03] [0.03]
Tangibility 0.31 (0.24) 0.32 (0.25) 0.37 (0.27)
[0.37] [0.25] [0.31]
Cash Flow Volatility 0.65 (0.16) 0.51 (1.17) 0.69 (1.29)
[1.42] [0.13] [0.1]
Dividend Payer 0.24 (0.00) 0.35 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47)
[0.43] [0.00] [0.00]
Cash Flow 0.00 (0.06) 0.06 (0.49) 0.02 (0.57)
[0.43] [0.07] [0.05]
Investment/Capital 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.11) 0.07 (0.08)
[0.07] [0.05] [0.06]
Firm-Quarter Obs 224,493 47,115 170
Firms 10,419 870 111
Table 1.2: Firm sample selection comparison: This table presents summary statistics– averages, [medians], and
(standard deviations)–for three samples of firm-quarter observations. COMPUSTAT Sample consists of all firm-quarter ob-
servations from non-financial firms in COMPUSTAT between 1995 and 2010. Convertibles sample consists of all firm-quarter
observations from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database that have at least one convertible bond
outstanding from 1995 to 2010. Conversions sample consists of all firm-quarter observations from non-financial firms in the
merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database for which at least for one of their convertible bond issues a conversion event is recorded
in FISD between 1995 and 2010. In both Convertible and Conversion samples, when there is more than one bond issue is
outstanding per firm data is aggregated across issues.
and control groups in the first part of the paper are identical in other dimensions.
1.2.3 Debt Conversion
Conversion is a unique feature of convertible debt instruments, which gives the right to either the debt holder
or borrower to exchange debt for equity under certain conditions. These conditions are typically related to
the price of the underlying commodity, e.g., a stock must be traded above a “conversion price” threshold for
30 trading days. If a borrower enforces a conversion this event is recorded as a “call” or a “conversion-forcing
call”. On the other hand, if a debt holder exercises the conversion option, it is recorded as a (voluntary)
“conversion”.
I focus attention on conversions that are decided by debt holders (voluntary conversions) and not con-
versions by the borrower or firm. Conversion-forcing calls, which are clearly planned by the firm, do not
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FISD Sample Convertibles Sample Conversions Sample
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Variable [Median] [Median] [Median]
Offering Yield (%) 7.32 (2.16) 4.90 (2.61) 5.23 (2.68)
[7.25] [4.875] [5.5 ]
Offering Amount ($M) 137.73 (139.58) 293.14 (421.82) 243.58 (436.77)
[100.00] [155.00] [125.00]
Offering to Maturity Period 8.10 (5.03) 13.10 (8.38) 12.01 (7.98)
[7.55] [9.99] [7.79]
Offering to Convertible Period 0.77 (2.06) 1.43 (1.81)
[0.00] [0.81]
Offering to Callable Period 3.93 (1.89) 3.33 (1.54)
[3.06] [3.01]
Convertible Period 13.30 (8.36) 10.26 (7.39)
[10.03] [6.97]
Fraction of Equity (%) 12.23 (10.51) 13.85 (13.18)
[9.86] [9.86]
Table 1.3: Bond sample selection comparison: This table presents summary statistics - averages, [medians], and
(standard deviations) - for the three samples of firm and issue observations. FISD sample consists of all bonds in FISD dataset
issued by non-financial firms outstanding at least for year between 1995 and 2010. Convertibles sample consists of all firm-
quarter observations from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database that have at least one convertible
bond outstanding from 1995 to 2010. Conversions sample consists of all firm-quarter observations from non-financial firms
in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database for which at least for one of their convertible bond issues a conversion event is
recorded in FISD between 1995 and 2010. In both Convertible and Conversion samples, when there is more than one bond
issue is outstanding per firm data is aggregated across issues. Offering Yield is the yield to maturity at the time of issuance
for fixed rate issues, Offering Amount is the par value of debt initially issued and Fraction of Equity is the percentage of the
total conversion commodity available through conversion of the issue. All time periods are in years.
represent anticipated shocks to capital structure; rather, they are almost 3 deterministic from the firm’s
management point of view.
In Table 1.4, I examine several features of voluntary conversions. Beginning with their frequency of
occurrence, 11% of convertible bond issuers in the sample experienced at least one conversion between 1995
and 2010, which constitutes about 16% of firm-quarter observations. Notice that some firms experienced
multiple conversions in this period. As a fraction of issues, 7% of convertible bond issues in FISD are
classified with at least one voluntary conversion event. This table also shows that the average amount of
conversion with respect to assets is 7% and therefore is an important event. First conversions in most cases
occur early: after 2.25 years for a typical convertible bond with 10 years of life.
3As pointed out by Asquith and Mullins (1991) when a firm calls an issue, investors are typically given a 30 day notice
period to convert their bonds into equity. Therefore, most calls are conversion-forcing calls unless the stock price falls drastically
enough during the 30-day notice that the conversion value becomes less than the call price. In that case the firm has to redeem
the issue in cash instead of forcing its conversion into equity.
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Conversions Sample
Measure Mean [Median] (SE)
Fraction of Firms with Conversion 0.11 [0.00] (0.01)
Fraction of Issues with Conversion 0.07 [0.00] (0.00)
Fraction of Obs with Conversion 0.160 [0.00] (0.01)
Time to First Conversion (years) 2.68 [2.25] (0.13)
Conversion Size (Fraction of Assets) 0.07 [0.02] (0.01)
Conversion Premium at Offering -0.27 [-0.24] (0.02)
Conversion Premium at Conversion -0.14 [0.17] (0.09)
Table 1.4: Summary of conversions: This table presents summary statistics-averages, [medians], and (standard errors)–
for a sample of all firm-quarter observations from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database for which
at least for one of their convertible bond issues a conversion event is recorded in FISD between 1995 and 2010. When there is
more than one bond issue is outstanding per firm data is aggregated across issues.
Conversion Premium
The conversion premium, pi, is the distance between the conversion price, p¯, and the current market price,
p, for the underlying commodity. To make it more tractable, I flip the normal definition for conversion
premium by multiplying it by −1 as in equation (1.1). In this definition, the larger the commodity price is,
the larger the conversion premium. When pi > 0 (pi < 0) the conversion option is in the money (out of the
money).
pi =
p− p¯
p
(1.1)
While mathematically straightforward, empirically measuring the conversion premium is challenging.
First, notice that FISD only reports the conversion premium at an event point such as a conversion or a call.
For all other points of time such as before or after the stock price passes the conversion threshold I have to
compute this number as follows. I keep track of slight changes in conversion price over time using FISD’s
Convertible History table. To measure how close the market price gets to the conversion price threshold, I
take the average of the highest monthly stock price for the three months in each quarter. I choose to do
this instead of using the monthly average stock price, since what triggers a conversion in reality is typically
a 30-day trade of the stock at a price above the conversion price. Therefore what matters is the upper tail
of the stock price, and not the mean or median. Obviously, this is an imperfect measure of the conversion
premium as it only uses three points of data in every quarter. For example, if the stock trades only for a few
days above the conversion price, the measure will underestimate the conversion premium, i.e., the distance
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to conversion price.
The last two rows of Table 1.4 summarize the conversion premium at issuance and at the time of con-
version. Notice that the thick left tail of conversion premium distribution results in a negative mean, even
at the time of conversion. However, the sample median at conversion shows that for the majority of issues
the stock price is about 17% above the conversion threshold. This is similar to the delay in calls reported
by Ingersoll (1977), Asquith (1995) and Asquith and Mullins (1991) among others. The median conversion
premium at the time of offering shows that for most of the bonds, the conversion price is set 24% above the
market price.
1.3 Debt Conversion and Financing Decisions : Theory and
Practice
Why would a debt conversion affect the financing decisions of a firm? This section answers this question by
breaking it into two parts? (i) How does financing policy respond to changes in capital structure. And, (ii)
how does a debt conversion change the capital structure?
1.3.1 Capital Structure Rebalancing
Does a change in capital structure affect future financing choices between debt and equity? In contrast
to Modigliani and Miller (1958a) view that advocates for the irrelevance of capital structure in absence of
market frictions, static the trade-off model provides evidence supporting the existence of this link. Trade-off
theory predicts that firms form an optimal leverage target and actively rebalance their positions in response
to any shock that causes a deviation from the target. Similar to the empirical literature on its competing
theory, pecking order (Myers and Majluf (1984)), which suggests a hierarchy for a firm’s preferences of
financing sources, empirical literature on target capital structure provides mixed conclusions.
The literature on capital structure rebalancing is divided into two broad categories: (i) partial adjustment
models (PAM) and its critiques, and (ii) papers outside partial adjustment model.
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Partial Adjustment Model (PAM)
The partial adjustment model links changes in leverage to its lagged deviation from a target. Several
empirical papers examine the sensitivity of this relationship, known as “speed of adjustment” (SOA). For
example, consistent with rebalancing toward a target capital structure, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and
Auerbach (1985) find statistically significant parameters for mean reversion in leverage. Further, Jalilvand
and Harris (1984) find that SOA is related to the firm size, expectation about interest rate and stock price
level. Nevertheless, PAM has been criticized from two different perspectives.
First, more recent studies such as Fama and French (2002), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Welch (2004)
and Iliev and Welch (2010) suggest that the rate of reversion to target is too slow to have a first-order
effect on capital structure. In particular, Iliev and Welch (2010) argue that once accounting for dynamic
misspecification in previous studies, partly due to boundedness of the leverage ratio between 0 and 1, the
SOA becomes zero or negative, i.e., no rebalancing. Second, Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999) as well as
Chang et al. (2006) question the power of PAM in distinguishing between trade-off and pecking order theories.
Using a Monte Carlo simulation they show that boundedness of leverage ratio can generate an artificial mean
reversion when there is no mean-reversion in generated data 4. In response to the first critique, Flannery and
Rangan (2006) provide evidence that adjustment speed increases significantly after controlling for expected
equity price changes in the target. Along the same line, Faulkender et al. (2011) argue that cash flow deficit or
surplus increases a firm’s willingness to interact with capital markets and therefore provides an opportunity
for leverage rebalancing. They show that SOA becomes significantly faster, if cash flow realization is taken
into account. Going back to the big picture, as Graham and Leary (2011) point out, perhaps:
“more work refining estimates of partial adjustment parameters may not be the most fruitful path
to answering this question. ... Rather, new methods outside the partial adjustment framework
may be necessary to identify the circumstances under which firms make deliberate, value-relevant
financing decisions and when they fail to do so.”
My paper is precisely an example for such an exercise recommended by Graham and Leary (2011): looking
at leverage response to a shock outside the PAM framework. I use changes in capital structure caused by
conversion of a convertible debt into equity and examine how capital structure reacts to a realized or an
anticipated conversion. The next section is an overview of other examples addressing target capital structure
4Iliev and Welch (2010) and Leary and Roberts (2005) also make the same point using Monte Carol simulation.
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response to a factor outside PAM.
Outside Partial Adjustment Model: Opportunities for Rebalancing
Other than studies that confirm association between leverage ratio and firm characteristics (e.g., firm size,
investment opportunities and marginal tax rate) that are consistent with trade-off theory (for example
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995),Graham (1996) and Hovakimian et al. (2001)) a few
studies examin capital structure rebalancing using leverage deviations caused by a factor outside PAM. My
paper adds to this literature by introducing another deviation in leverage, namely debt conversion.
Although leverage deviations in papers outside PAM originate from different factors inside or outside the
firm, they all seem to be consistent with the trade-off theory. Using deviations in capital structure caused
by an accumulation of earnings or losses over time Hovakimian et al. (2001) show that when firms raise or
retire capital (including convertible debt) they use those opportunities to move toward their target leverage
levels rather than to offset the deviations caused by earning and loss accumulations. They emphasize the
role of capital repurchase/retirement as opposed to issuance as an opportunity for moving towards the target
leverage. Using a discrete choice model, they find that leverage deviation predicts the sign and the size for
debt and equity repurchase, but not for their issuance. Contrary to active rebalancing theory, Baker and
Wurgler (2002) provide evidence for passive “market timing” by managements. By factoring market to book
ratio with the amount of capital raised (financial deficit) they conclude that current leverage ratios are the
result of historical stock price movements. In other words, high leverage ratios tend to mean revert, by
issuing equity but only in favorable market conditions (market timing).
Related to market timing, Alti (2006) uses deviation in capital structure due to “hotness” of the IPO
market at the time of initial public offering. He finds that firms that time the market by going public
when the IPO market is hot, i.e., high volume of IPO activity, tend to raise more equity and therefore
have lower leverage ratios than those who enter a cold market. However, subsequent reverse pattern in new
capital issuance causes leverage differences to fade within two years. Kayhan and Titman (2007) investigate
long-term capital structure adjustments in response to deviations from the target caused by historical stock
price movements and financial deficit. Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002) they confirm the role of
historical changes in cash flow, capital expenditure and stock price on leverage ratios which tend to persist
over years. However, their findings also show that long-term reverse adjustments will eventually offset those
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deviations in such a way that they move capital structure back toward its target level.
Finally, Harford et al. (2009) use deviations in leverage due to the type of financing instrument chosen in
large merger and acquisition deals. Consistent with target capital structure theory, they find that deviation
from a firm’s target leverage before an acquisition influences both the choice of financing method in an
acquisition and how the bidder rebalances its position afterwards. Specifically, they show that immediately
following a debt-financed acquisition, the bidders rebalance their position in such a way that compensates
for 75% of the merger induced increase in leverage in 5 years.
A distinguishing feature of my paper as compared to the above examples is the exogeneity of deviations in
capital structure. A second look at the examples above indicates that the leverage deviations from the target
is usually caused by a variable of choice, and therefore is an endogenous firm decisions rather than a shock.
Deviations caused by the choice of financing method in Harford et al. (2009), (delays in) equity issuance
in Baker and Wurgler (2002), historical cash flow or capital expenditure choices in Kayhan and Titman
(2007), the choice of when to enter the IPO market in Alti (2006) and the accumulation of earnings or losses
in Hovakimian et al. (2001) are all endogenously determined by management decision. In contrast, in my
setting voluntary conversion of a convertible debt (or anticipation of such conversion) which is triggered by
the stock price passing the conversion threshold is decided by the debt holder, and not the firm. Therefore,
under the assumption of “no price manipulation” by firm management around the conversion price threshold,
resulting deviations in capital structure can be considered as exogenous to management decisions. This is
certainly a step forward toward the identification of capital structure response to its deviation and ultimately
to testing the static trade-off theory.
1.3.2 Debt Conversion and Capital Structure
Conversion of a convertible bond into equity creates a drop in leverage that might be endogenous or exogenous
to the firm. When converted, the long-term debt item on the balance sheet would decrease by the face value
of the converted amount and the equity term would increase roughly by the same amount (as a function of
the amount converted, times the conversion ratio). Clearly, as a result, the leverage ratio would drop by the
ratio of the converted amount to total assets. Whether this drop is endogenous or exogenous to the firm
depends on who decides on conversion. Evidently, if the firm redeems an issue using a conversion-forcing call,
the conversion decision is endogenous to the firm. Depending on the terms of the contract regarding the call
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provision the firm may be given the privilege to call a convertible bond when it is in the money or even out
of the money. However, for in the money conversions, if the conversion is initiated by bond holders this may
be seen as an exogenous event to the firm, under the assumption that there is no stock price manipulation
around the conversion threshold.
Whether a conversion falls into the endogenous or exogenous category depends on call provisions in the
debt contract that determine the level of protection for an investor against a call by the firm. Generally
speaking, convertible bonds may be (i) callable anytime (no protection), (ii) callable conditional on stock
price passing a threshold and staying there for certain number of days (soft protection), (iii) not callable
for a certain period (hard protection) and (iv) not callable at all (absolute protection)5. One suspects
that voluntary conversions are more likely to be detected in categories (iii) and/or (iv). A subset of those
conversions that occur during the call protection period are less likely to be influenced by the firm and
therefore are considered the most exogenous conversions in section 1.4.
Why Issue Convertible Bonds?
A convertible bond is a hybrid security that mixes a straight bond features with those of a standard equity.
More importantly, convertible bonds are state contingent securities, which may be transformed from a bond
type into a equity type structure in different states of the world, usually as a function of the stock price. The
contract specifies the conditions under which the conversion option maybe exercised either at borrower’s
discretion , i.e., a call or at lender’s discretion, i.e., a voluntary conversion. Given the state dependent
structure of convertible bonds, we ask what is the use of the conversion option? And what does theory
predict about capital structure policy at the conversion point?
There are two broad classes of theories explaining why firms issue convertible bonds. According to these
theories convertible bonds are issued as a solution to problems concerning either (i) asymmetric information or
(ii) agency problem. The first reason why firms issue convertible bonds addresses the asymmetric information
between insiders (existing shareholders or management) and outsiders (lenders/bondholders) about the firm’s
type. In a pooling equilibrium this results in higher financing costs for good types. Kim (1990) provides
a model in which good type firms differentiate from lemons in a separating equilibrium by signally their
type via the “conversion ratio.” Good types, with favorable information about future earnings, prefer to
5Consistent with sequential financing theory (Mayers (1998)) Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) show that the level of protection
is inversely related to future investment: the lower the call protection, the sooner and the larger the investment.
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absorb more equity risk by lowering dilution in equity after conversion and therefore offer a lower conversion
ratio in equilibrium. The market reads this as a signal for good future earnings, and therefore reacts more
favorably. In Stein (1992)’ model firms can avoid the adverse-selection costs associated with direct equity
sales by issuing equity “through the back door”. In this model, high quality firms issue convertible bonds
instead of costly straight equity in order to delay their stock issuance to a time when uncertainty about
the firm type is resolved. What separates a good type from a lemon is a special feature of the call option
that can be exercised only when the stock price is higher than the conversion threshold. This model also
rationalizes the mild negative announcement effect for issuance of convertible bonds. (Mikkelson (1985) and
Lewis et al. (1999))
The second motivation for issuing convertible bonds addresses the agency problem between existing
shareholders and bondholders. Agency costs can potentially cause two inefficient outcomes: (i) underinvest-
ment due to “risk-shifting” behavior (Myers and Majluf (1984)), and (ii) over-investment or free cash flow
(Jensen (1986)) due to “sequential-financing” problem. Risk-shifting arises when an investment decision is
not observable by the bondholders and therefore is not contractable. Due to limited liabilities, shareholders
(or management) may have incentive to invest in very risky projects at the expense of debt holders resulting
in underinvestment in equilibrium. Green (1984) presents a model in which convertible bonds (or war-
rants) mitigate the risk-shifting problem by reducing the upside benefits of excessive risk taking for existing
shareholders. In good states once a bond is converted, former bondholders would become new shareholders
and therefore would share the upside gains with existing shareholders. Thus, by alleviating the incentive
problem, convertible bonds offer a solution to underinvestment. Sequential-financing which involves an in-
vestment option with a future maturity date, is another cause of the incentive conflict between bondholders
and management. Upfront funding (leaving the funds in the hands of a manager before uncertainty about
the profitability of an investment project is resolved) may result in overinvestment in current non-profitable
investments. In Mayers (1998)’s model convertibility solves the future financing problem by matching fi-
nancing options with investment options. When the investment option is in the money, and therefore the
stock price is on the rise, the conversion option will also be in the money. Conversion of debt into equity will
free up debt capacity which then can be used to raise new capital for investment projects. This provides a
solution to overinvestment, since up front financing is no longer required.
Although all explanations suggest that convertible bonds can be designed to induce managers to make
efficient capital expenditure decisions, the only theory predicting a capital structure reaction to a conversion
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is Mayers (1998). He predicts that a drop in leverage because of conversion frees up a firm’s debt capacity
to finance new investments. He also provides empirical evidence showing an increase in financing activities
(issuance of long-term debt and common stocks) following a conversion. However, the direction of reaction
is not completely clear. On one hand Mayers (1998) provides support for capital structure rebalancing by
predicting new debt financing after conversion. On the other hand the rise in equity financing following a
conversion would predict just the opposite. Therefore, capital structure response to a conversion remains an
empirical question.
1.4 The Response of Leverage to a Realized Conversion
1.4.1 Graphical Analysis
Figure 1.1 presents the time trend of the average leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total book value of
debt to total assets, relative to the quarter in which voluntary conversion occurs. This figure also presents
the 90% confidence intervals, indicated by the bands around the averages. It is clear that there is a drop in
average leverage immediately at conversion quarter. During the years before conversion the average leverage
ratio is 34.0%, and 31.8% in t−2 and t−1 respectively while over the first year after conversion the leverage
ratio is 27.7%. Therefore, the figure suggests a temporal break or discontinuity in leverage coinciding with
voluntary conversion. Moreover, consistent with re-balancing theory, Figure 1.1 illustrates that the average
leverage ratio bounces back between t+1 and t+3 to its original level at t−8. Another interesting observation
in Figure 1.1 is the temporal rise in the average leverage ratio between periods t−6 to t−3 which is consistent
with the pre-balancing theory in section 1.5. Whether or not these patterns are significant in the presence
of other determinants of capital structure is investigated in the next section.
1.4.2 Diff-in-Diff Analysis at Conversion
To examine the impact of a realized conversion on leverage, we use Baker and Wurgler (2002) specification
for difference in leverage, as follows:
∆Lit = β0 + β1 Conversion Dummyit + β2Xit + β3Lit−1 + λt + it, (1.2)
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Figure 1.1: Leverage in event time leading to conversion: The sample includes firm-quarter observations from
non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database for which at least for one of their convertible bond issues a
conversion event during the hard call protection period is recorded in FISD between 1995 and 2010. The figure presents average
book leverage in event time relative to when one of the convertible bonds outstanding is voluntarily converted. Squares present
the average leverage ratio for the sample at each quarter and bands around squares denote 90% confidence interval.
where ∆Lit is the first difference in leverage ratio for firm i in year-quarter t, Conversion Dummyit is a
treatment indicator variable that switches on in a conversion quarter, Xit is a vector of conventional control
variables or leverage including Log of Total Assets, Market to Book ratio, Profitability, Tangibility, Industry
Median Leverage and Cash Flow Volatility. λt captures the time fixed effect, which is equal to the sum
of the year and quarter fixed effects. The coefficient of interest in this regression is β1 which is effectively
a difference-in-difference coefficient. It compares leverage changes before and after a conversion, between
firm-quarter observations with and without a conversion. The benefit of diff-in-diff specification as compared
to a simple difference equation for before and after conversion is that, by contrasting with a control group,
it takes non-treatment changes in leverage into account. The results are unchanged if we use a difference
model instead of difference-in-difference, where the dependent variable is the level of leverage instead of its
first difference. The results are also robust to the inclusion of a lagged leverage ratio as a control. 6
Table 1.5 presents the estimation results for equation (1.2) for three samples. In “Convertibles Sample”
the leverage ratio for voluntary conversions is compared to that of all convertible bond issuers. Comparing
6The estimation results for both alternative specifications are not reported but are available upon request.
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firms under conversion to the ones that never experience a conversion raises a valid concern about the effect of
unobservable factors in the first group that may affect the changes in leverage, and therefore may weaken the
comparison result. To address this concern, in “Conversions Sample” the former control group is restricted
only to the firms that eventually experience a conversion. This ensures that possible genetic differences that
might relate conversion to leverage changes are presents in both the treatment and control groups. Finally,
to compare the impact of all voluntary conversions to the more exogenous conversions that occur during the
call protection period (when a firm is most restricted from influencing the conversion decision) in “Restricted
Conversions” I change the treatment definition to the subset of voluntary conversions that occur during the
call protection period. Similarly, the control group is chosen from the firms that eventually have such a
conversion.
Dependent Variable: Changes in Book Leverage
Convertibles Sample Conversions Sample Restricted Conversions
Conversion Dummy -0.051 -0.054 -0.042 -0.035 -0.044 -0.035
(-11.80) (-14.12) (-6.44) (-4.88) (-4.44) (-2.57)
Log(Assets) 0.001 0.005 0.019
(2.25) (1.18) (2.57)
Market to Book -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(-6.39) (-1.76) (-.84)
Profitability -0.198 -0.403 -0.689
(-14.11) (-4.46) (-3.80)
Tangibility 0.012 0.041 0.171
(5.06) (1.74) (2.89)
Industry Med Lev 0.03 0.04 -0.10
(5.61) (.60) (-.83)
Cash Flow Vol 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.38) (.09) (.29)
Dividend Payer 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-.61) (-.17) (-.22)
(Book Leverage) t-1 -0.167 -0.059 -0.248 -0.238 -0.396 -0.494
(-45.93) (-23.05) (-12.26) (-10.12) (-8.35) (-11.92)
Intercept 0.050 0.029 0.081 0.061 0.118 0.122
(12.58) (2.80) (7.85) (1.48) (4.00) (1.42)
Year and Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs 17278 15189 873 797 202 178
R2 0.053 0.056 0.097 0.12 0.45 0.58
Table 1.5: Change in leverage at conversion: This table presents estimation results for three samples. Convertibles
sample consists of all firm-quarter observations from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database that have
at least one convertible bond outstanding from 1995 to 2010. Conversions sample consists of all firm-quarter observations
from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database for which at least for one of their convertible bond issues
a conversion event is recorded in FISD between 1995 and 2010. Restricted conversions sample is a subset of Conversions
sample, including only firm-quarter observations that a conversion happened during the call protection period. The table
presents regression results, where the depended variable in each regression is the first difference in book leverage. t-statistics
are reported in parenthesis.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) present simple correlations between Conversion Dummy and the leverage ratio.
Similar to Figure 1.1 in all three samples a conversion results in a significant drop in leverage ratio of the
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order of 4.4% to 5.1%. Relative to the average leverage ratio of 34% in quarters with no conversion this
estimate translates into a relative decrease in leverage of 12% to 15%.
Specifications (2), (4) and (6) include additional controls variables, used in previous studies (Titman and
Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham et al. (1998) and MacKay and Phillips (2005)). The sign
and significance of the coefficient estimates on these control variables are consistent with previous studies.
Nevertheless, their inclusion has little effect on the estimated impact of the conversion on leverage. The
only exception is the drop in significance of the impact in the last sample, Restricted Conversions although
the sign stays the same. This might be the result of the shrinkage of the sample size (i.e., 59 conversions).
In summary, Table 1.5 shows a statistically and economically significant impact of a realized conversion on
leverage ratio that is robust to the inclusion of control variables and time fixed effects.
1.4.3 Leverage Dynamics After Conversion
In this section I investigate whether or not firms actively rebalance their capital structure in response to
the significant changes illustrated in section 1.4.2. I use a specification similar to that for equation (1.2),
where the dependent variable is the leverage level instead of its first difference. To compare the leverage
ratio between firms who had a conversion in the past vs. those who did not, I run a separate regression for
each quarter following a conversion for upto six quarters subsequent to the conversion. More precisely, in
each regression the Conversion Dummyit−s variable switches on if there is a conversion s quarters prior.
Therefore, β1 captures the difference of the leverage ratio between observations with and without a conversion
s quarters after the conversion. A significant β1 coefficient indicates no or partial rebalancing, whereas an
insignificant estimate for β1 is shows full rebalancing.
Table 1.6 presents the estimation results for three samples, in panels A, B and C. On each row, columns
(1) to (7) present the regression results for each of the s quarters following a conversion, s ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 6},
i.e., a total of 21 regressions. For each regression, only the coefficient on Conversion Dummyit−s is reported
in this table, but all regressions include the control variables used in Table1.5 as well as year and quarter
fixed effects. Panel A includes observations from the “Conversion Sample” in Table 1.5, where I use a
one-quarter “no-event” cushion around each control and treatment quarter. In other words, I restrict the
sample to only those observations for which no other event (conversion, call, etc.) is recorded in the quarter
immediately before or after. Similarly, panel C uses a four-quarter cushion around both control and treatment
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observations. Panel B which uses exactly the same sample as the Conversion Sample in Table 1.5 uses a one-
year cushion for the treatment and four-year cushion for the control group. Adding “no-event” cushions helps
to purify the treatment effect, here conversion impact. For example, when there is a series of conversions
the outcome behavior might be different than when there is a single conversion. Similarly, a good control
or treatment observation should not have any recent call or a conversion, otherwise one has to deal with a
mixture of different treatments. These examples illustrate the benefits of the “no-event” cushion and how
lack of such cushions may result in an unreliable estimates.
Dependent Variable: Book Leverage
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Panel A: One-period Cushion for both Treatment and Control
Conversion Dummy -0.0671 -0.0577 -0.0336 -0.0199 -0.0095 -0.0173 -0.0133
t-stat (-6.26) (-4.99) (-2.94) (-1.83) (-0.89) (-1.51) (-1.11)
R2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
Obs 1374 1379 1371 1367 1364 1357 1342
Panel B: One and Four-period Cushion for Treatment and Control
Conversion Dummy -0.0506 -0.0352 -0.0259 -0.011 -0.0012 -0.006 -0.0058
t-stat (-5.1) (-3.35) (-2.42) (-0.98) (-0.11) (-0.48) (-0.46)
R2 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.32
Obs 801 802 800 795 796 792 792
Panel C: Four-period Cushion for both Treatment and Control
Conversion Dummy -0.05 -0.0336 -0.026 -0.0208 -0.0121 -0.0113 -0.0074
t-stat (-4.27) (-2.68) (-2.01) (-1.55) (-0.89) (-0.77) (-0.48)
R2 0.15 0.2 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.33
Obs 734 733 732 729 729 726 726
Table 1.6: Leverage dynamics post-conversion: This table presents estimation results for three samples in seven
periods, total of 21 regressions. All three panels contains firm-quarter observations from non-financial firms in the merged
FISD-COMPUSTAT database that have at least one convertible bond outstanding which eventually will be converted at some
point between 1995 and 2010. In panel A observations that have any event in period before or after t are dropped from
both treatment and control groups. In panel B observations that have any event in previous or next period are dropped from
treatment and the ones that have any event in the past or next four periods with respect to t are dropped from control group.
In panel C observations that have any event in past or next four periods are dropped from both treatment and control groups.
The table presents regression results, where the depended variable in each regression is the book leverage level in periods marked
on the second row of the table. Quarter t is the conversion quarter, quarter t+1 is one year after conversion, quarter t+2 is
two years after and so on . Conversion dummy is an indicator variable that switches on when there is a conversion in period t.
All regressions include control variable used in Table 1.5 as well as year and quarter fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis.
The findings in Table 1.6 support a fairly quick rebalancing in capital structure in response to negative
leverage shock caused by debt conversion. Columns (1) to (3) in Panel B of Table 1.6 show that the 5.1%
drop in leverage level in the conversion quarter, shrinks to 3.5% and then to 2.6% in the second and third
quarters and then to zero (insignificant) thereafter. Similarly, in panel C the leverage gap between the control
and treatment group closes after three quarters. Finally, in panel A, where I use only a one-year no-event
cushion around the treatment and control quarters, I observe fairly similar results. Although the estimated
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drop in leverage is slightly larger than panel B and C, it fades away after four quarters. The 6.7% drop in
leverage caused by conversion, contracts to 5.8% in the second quarter, 3.4% in the third quarter, 2.0% in
the fourth quarter and finally disappears after that. This corresponds to a 1.7% increase in leverage in each
quarter following conversion, which translates into an approximately 5% speed of adjustment (SOA) relative
to the average leverage ratio before conversion. In sum, consistent with capital structure rebalancing, I
observe that a drop in the leverage ratio in response to a voluntary conversion is reversed in less than a year.
One must acknowledge the possibility of estimation bias due to selection (Heckman (1979)) in my results.
After all, conversion is not a randomly assigned treatment. While previous studies (Constantinides and
Grundy (1987) and Asquith and Mullins (1991)) found conversion motivations which boils down to observable
cash flow differences between coupon vs. dividend streams, the presence of unobservable factors affecting a
conversion makes a causal interpretation virtually impossible. In the interest of saving space, I intentionally
skip correcting for such a bias in the estimates for two reasons. First, the choice of control group in the
Conversion Sample limits the comparison to only firms that eventually have a conversion. This guarantees
that if there is any unobservable factor in their genes affecting the decision to take the treatment, (i.e. to
convert,) it is common between the treatment and control group. The robustness of my results makes it less
likely for leverage changes to be affected by such unobservables. Second, the main purpose of this section is
to offer a descriptive rather than a causal explanation for what occurs after a conversion. Having said that,
I keep the caveat in mind and use it as a motivation for the quasi-experiment analysis in the next section.
1.5 The Response of Leverage to an Anticipated Conversion
In this section I examine the possibility of rebalancing even before the realization of a leverage shock. I
ask if there is any evidence confirming a preemptive increase in leverage when a drop due to conversion is
anticipated. The key challenge here is to measure when such a leverage shock is truly anticipated. The
unique feature of convertible bonds that links debt conversion to the level of the underlying commodity price
enables us to have a tractable measure for “shock anticipation.” When the stock price passes the conversion
price threshold (i.e., conversion premium=0) the conversion option becomes in the money, meaning that
bond holders have the right to exercise their option by exchanging their bonds for equity. This generates a
discontinuity (negative jump) in the expected amount of debt, and consequently in the anticipated leverage
ratio. In the next section, I exploit this discontinuity for identification using regression discontinuity design.
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1.5.1 Empirical Strategy: A Regression Discontinuity Design
An ideal framework to study the existence of pre-balancing in the data, i.e., whether or not the leverage
ratio responds to changes in anticipated leverage, is a randomized experiment, where treatment (change in
anticipated leverage) is assigned randomly to a subset of observations (treatment group) and their resulting
behavior is contrasted to an untreated (control) group. Given that running a controlled experiment in corpo-
rate finance is virtually impossible to implement, I turn to the closest proxy: a quasi-experiment. Regression
discontinuity design provides such a quasi-experimental framework where the probability of receiving the
treatment changes discontinuously as a function of one of the variables, here stock price. As Lee (2008)
points out in such a design once one gets close to the discontinuity threshold (i.e, conversion price), one can
assume that observations are randomly assigned to each side of the threshold. Firm-quarter observations
for which the stock price is greater (less) than the conversion price and therefore are located to the right
(left) of the threshold constitute the treatment (control) group. Specifically, the treatment variable ITMit
(In The Money) is defined as:
ITMit =
 1 piit > 00 piit ≤ 0 (1.3)
where, i and t index firm and year-quarter observations, and piit is the conversion premium for the underlying
convertible bond (the distance between stock price and conversion price as defined in equation (1.1)). My
sample consists of non-financial firm-quarter observations in merged FISD-COMPUSTAT between 1995 and
2010 for which a convertible bond is outstanding, eventually, but not currently, experience a voluntary
conversion and have four quarters of “no-event” cushions before and after the quarter they show up in the
sample.
Table 1.7 presents the summary statistics for the treatment (ITM = 1) and control (ITM = 0) sub-
samples. As the first indication of pre-balancing, the second and third rows reveal an economically and
statistically significant increase in book and market leverage ratios when comparing out of the money (con-
trol) to in the money (treatment) samples. From left to right of the conversion threshold, the average
book leverage increases by 0.03, from 0.27 to 0.30, an 11% increase. Similarly, the average market leverage
leaps by 0.06, from 0.20 to 0.26, a % 23 raise. In contrast to changes in average leverage ratio, there is no
significant heterogeneity in any of the leverage related firm characteristics on other rows (all p-values are
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greater than 0.10). This makes the two sub-samples a close match, which is consistent with the notion of
random assignment of treatment, making perfect treatment/control groups for the experiment. Although
we control in my regression model for those firm characteristics, these similarities make my inferences from
unconditional comparison in non-parametric sections a valid analysis.
Out of the Money Sample In the Money Sample
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Obs Mean Median SD p-value
Conversion Premium 104 -21.71 -21.05 14.04 152 24.69 24.67 13.75 0.00
Book Leverage 98 0.27 0.26 0.16 152 0.30 0.28 0.17 0.10
Market Leverage 98 0.20 0.16 0.16 152 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.01
Log(Assets) 104 7.67 8.03 1.82 152 7.81 7.81 1.40 0.48
Market to Book Ratio 104 2.01 1.65 1.22 152 2.03 1.57 1.36 0.86
Profitability 104 0.03 0.03 0.03 152 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.69
Tangibility 104 0.32 0.25 0.23 152 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.97
Cash Flow Volatility 104 0.35 0.10 0.68 152 0.24 0.09 0.62 0.18
Dividend Payer 104 0.38 0.00 0.49 152 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.40
Cash Flow 104 0.15 0.11 0.52 152 0.16 0.10 0.33 0.84
Investment/Capital 104 0.06 0.04 0.11 152 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.84
Table 1.7: Effect of anticipated conversions: This table presents summary statistics - averages, medians, and standard
deviations - for two samples. Out of the money sample consists of non-financial firm-quarter observations in merged FISD-
COMPUSTAT between 1995 and 2010 that satisfy the following conditions: (1) have at least one convertible bond outstanding,
(2) experience at least one conversion after the quarter they show up in this table, (3) do not experience any of the events listed
in Table 1.11 such as conversion, call, repurchase, etc. in neither the past four quarters, nor in the next four quarters and (4)
their stock price is below the conversion price, i.e., conversion premium < 0. In the money sample has the same conditionals
(1) to (3) as out of the money sample, but with an opposite last condition, i.e., (4’): their stock price is above the conversion
price, i.e., conversion premium > 0 . One sided p-values are calculated for on two sample mean comparisons test for each row.
1.5.2 Unconditional Response
Figure 1.2 presents the average leverage ratio for firm-quarter observations in treatment and control groups
in four sub-samples constructed based on the conversion premium for the underlying convertible bond for the
firm i at time t. The four bins of conversion premium are: deep out of the money, with piit ∈ (−50%,−25%);
out of the money with piit ∈ (−25%, 0%); in the money with piit ∈ (0%,+25%) and deep in the money,
piit ∈ (+25%,+50%). Similar to Figure 1.1, squares represent book leverage averages and surrounding
bands denote the 90% confidence intervals. Immediately, we observe that there is a discontinuous increase
in leverage ratio, around the conversion threshold. When comparing firms located to the lft of conversion
threshold (piit ∈ (−25%, 0%)) with the ones to the right (piit ∈ (0%,+25%)) in period t, the average leverage
ratio jumps from 0.30 to 0.34 in the same period. This effect seems to be persistent in (t − 1) and (t + 1),
indicating that pre-balancing begins one quarter prior and continues to the quarter immediately after t, t
being the quarter in which stock price crosses the conversion threshold. Note, Figure 1.2 provides two simple
falsification tests at piit = −25 and piit = +25: unlike at the conversion threshold (piit = 0) we observe no
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break in average leverage ratio in either of these two thresholds. This confirms that my findings are not
driven by a general pattern in data and are specific to the conversion threshold.
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Figure 1.2: Leverage response to proximity to conversion: The sample includes firm-quarter observations from
non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database with a convertible bond issue outstanding. Observations are
sorted based on conversion premium at quarter t into each of the four bins between -50%, -25%, 0, 25% and 50% on horizontal
axis. The figure presents average book leverage in period t (as well as (t-1) and (t+1) ) for the portfolio of firms in each bin.
Squares present the average leverage ratio and bands around squares denote 90% confidence interval for the average leverage
in quarter t. Marked bands denote the confidence interval for period t.
Table 1.8 presents the same data as in Figure 1.2, but for an extended time horizon, beginning from four
quarters before and continuing to four quarters after crossing the conversion threshold. Similar to Figure
1.2, columns (1) to (4) present the average leverage ratio for four bins of conversion premiums. The last
column compares the average leverage ratio for the middle two bins, using a two sample mean comparison
test. The p-values show that data rejects the null hypothesis in favor of a jump at the conversion threshold,
only in periods (t-1), t and (t+1), at 0.10, 0.06 and 0.05 levels. This shows that pre-balancing does not
begin until the period before crossing the conversion threshold and stops one period after that.
In sum, consistent with the pre-balancing hypothesis, the unconditional comparison of the average lever-
age ratio for the firm-quarter observations to the left and right of the conversion threshold reveals an eco-
nomically and statistically significant increase in leverage. This preemptive increase in leverage tends to
start one quarter before crossing the threshold and continues during and after that quarter.
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Conversion Premium Bins
(-50, -25) (-25,0) (0,+25) (+25,+50) p-value
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) > (2)
t-4 26.28 28.05 30.16 33.67 0.29
t-3 25.89 27.29 31.05 32.67 0.14
t-2 26.74 26.87 30.83 34.02 0.12
t-1 25.79 26.08 30.43 34.31 0.10
t 25.37 25.23 30.31 34.01 0.06
t+1 24.74 24.25 29.65 32.67 0.05
t+2 23.89 24.71 28.40 31.74 0.12
t+3 22.70 23.80 27.56 30.99 0.12
t+4 21.34 24.38 26.81 29.06 0.22
Table 1.8: Leverage response to distance from anticipated conversion: For each period (row) columns (1) to (4)
presents average book leverage value for non-financial firm-quarter observations in merged FISD-COMPUSTAT between 1995
and 2010 with a convertible bond issue outstanding, for which conversion premium falls into one of the four bins between -50%,
-25%, 0, 25% and 50%. For example, column (1) shows the average leverage value in quarter (t-4) to (t+4) for the group of
firms with an outstanding convertible bond for which −50% < conversion premium < −25% in quarter t. Last column reports
the one-sided p-values for testing if leverage ratio for firms in column (2) is less than leverage ratio for the ones in (3). All
leverage means are reported in percentage.
1.5.3 Parametric and Non-parametric Analysis
In this section, I expand the size of the window around the conversion threshold to the entire sample. I do so
taking the standard approach illustrated in Lee and Lemieux (2010) by controlling for possible information
contained in the distance between stock price and the conversion price threshold using a polynomials in the
conversion premium piit. Allowing for different polynomials for observations on the left-hand side of the
threshold Pl(piit, γ
l) and on the right-hand side of the threshold Pr(piit, γ
r) gives:
Lit = β0 + β1ITMit + β2Xit + Pl(piit, γ
l) + Pr(piit, γ
r) + λt + µi + it (1.4)
where Lit is the leverage ratio for firm i in year-quarter t,ITMit is the treatment dummy (defined in equation
(1.3)) which isolates the effect of discontinuity in anticipated leverage, Xit is a vector of conventional control
variables or leverage including Log of Total Assets, Market to Book ratio, Profitability, Tangibility, Industry
Median Leverage and Cash Flow Volatility. µi is a firm fixed effect, λt is a time fixed effect, which is equal
to the sum of the year and quarter fixed effects, and it is a random error term. The coefficient of interest
in this regression is β1 which represents the impact of a drop in anticipated leverage due to near future
debt conversion on the current leverage ratio. A positive and significant β1 rejects the null hypothesis of no
pre-balancing ( i.e., H0 : β1 = 0) in favor of the pre-balancing alternative.
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Table 1.9 presents the estimation results for the entire sample 7. All specifications include year and quarter
fixed effects and results for both models with and without firm fixed effects are presented as indicated at the
bottom of the table. The first column, presenting results for the linear polynomial case, reveal that as soon
as the conversion option becomes in the money, meaning a drop in leverage is anticipated, average leverage
leaps by 7.4%. Relative to an average book leverage ratio of approximately 34.1%, this estimate translates
into a relative preemptive increase in leverage of almost 21%. The second column confirms a positive jump
in leverage, although at a lower significance level due to inclusion of the firm fixed effect terms.
Columns (1) and (2) also show that there is indeed information about leverage changes contained in the
distance between stock price and the conversion threshold. The negative slope for the linear term for the
first-order polynomial in these columns (as well as for higher order polynomials in other columns) on both
sides of the conversion threshold shows a general decreasing trend in leverage as the stock price increases.
This pattern is also depicted in Figure 1.4 in appendix which presents the graphical version of the results
in column (1). The downward slope of leverage in conversion premium or stock price might be due to debt
retirement and equity issuance as pointed out by Hovakimian et al. (2001). They find that when stock price
rises, firms generally issue more equity and retire debt.
My result is robust for a higher order polynomial and inclusion of leverage control variables. Specifications
(3) to (4) expand the model by using fourth-order8 polynomial instead of linear. Similarly, in columns (5)
and (6) the model is further expanded by incorporating additional control variables for leverage introduced in
equation (1.2). None of these modifications have any impact on the estimated preemptive increase in leverage.
Even in the most saturated model in column (6) which includes a fourth-order polynomial, leverage control
variables plus time and firm fixed effects, still there is a significant jump in leverage of 5.4% around the
conversion threshold, which translates to about 16% relative to the average leverage.
Finally, Table 1.10 presents results for the non-parametric analysis. In this table I consider three possible
window sizes around the conversion threshold, i.e., (−12%,+12%), (−25%,+25%), and (−50%,+50%). Each
column presents the difference in average leverage ratio for observations to the right and to the left of the
conversion threshold in each of the three windows. Panel A to E presents changes in the average leverage
ratio in period (t-2) to (t+2), where t is the quarter in which the stock price passes the conversion threshold.
Columns (1) and (2) show that for a narrow bandwidth of 12% the result disappears. However, if one
7I excluded outliers with extremely negative conversion premium values, i.e., piit < −1200%. This results in losing only 9
observations out of 639–about 1% reduction in sample size.
8In an unreported regression I also use a polynomial of order five, but the main result is unchanged.
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Dependent Variable: Book Leverage
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In the Money (ITM) 0.074 0.019 0.072 0.070 0.061 0.054
(2.90) (1.33) (2.46) (2.42) (2.25) (2.01)
Conversion Premium -0.032 -0.002 -0.136 -0.139 -0.103 -0.111
(-4.96) (-.46) (-4.40) (-4.51) (-3.52) (-3.74)
Conversion Premium*ITM -0.142 -0.192 -0.582 -0.562 -0.857 -0.745
(-2.37) (-4.78) (-1.31) (-1.28) (-2.09) (-1.84)
Conversion Premium2 -0.065 -0.069 -0.040 -0.044
(-3.93) (-4.20) (-2.60) (-2.81)
Conversion Premium2*ITM 3.274 3.223 4.666 3.965
(1.58) (1.57) (2.42) (2.09)
Conversion Premium3 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.007
(-3.37) (-3.67) (-2.16) (-2.36)
Conversion Premium3*ITM -6.374 -6.368 -8.876 -7.432
(-1.79) (-1.81) (-2.67) (-2.27)
Conversion Premium4 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(-2.85) (-3.13) (-1.82) (-2.00)
Conversion Premium4*ITM 3.861 3.922 5.259 4.327
(1.95) (2.01) (2.85) (2.37)
Leverage Med Industry 0.368 0.078
(2.67) (.43)
Log(Assets) 0.016 0.095
(1.43) (3.90)
Market to Book 0.032 0.038
(5.82) (6.11)
Profitability -0.536 -0.473
(-3.22) (-2.70)
Tangibility 0.197 0.197
(3.63) (2.87)
Cash Flow Volatility 0.063
(2.81)
Dividend Payer -0.024 -0.026
(-1.39) (-1.40)
Constant 0.374 0.380 0.052 -0.600
(12.07) (13.49) (.55) (-2.94)
Year and Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs 486 486 486 486 458 458
R2 0.21 0.87 0.097 0.88 0.29 0.91
Table 1.9: Discontinuity regressions for the entire sample: The sample includes all firm-quarter observations between
1995 and 2010 from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database that satisfy the following conditions: (1)
have at least one convertible bond outstanding, (2) experience at least one conversion after the quarter they show up in this
table, and (3) do not experience any of the events listed in Table 1.11 such as conversion, call, repurchase, etc. in neither the past
four quarters, nor the next four quarters. The table presents regression results, where the depended variable in each regression
is the book leverage. ITM (In The Money) is a dummy variable which switches on when stock price is above conversion price,
i.e, conversion option is in the money. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
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expands the bandwidth to 25% in columns (3) and (4), one observes a significant increase in leverage in the
range of 3.3% to 4.9% in quarters t and t+1. Likewise, further increases the bandwidth to 50%, suggest
pre-balancing in leverage in magnitudes of 4.2% to 5.4% in quarters t-1, t and t+1. The reason we do not
observe the result in columns (1) and (2) can reflect two possibilities. First, the minimum sample size is
only 66, as opposed to 139 and 266 for the wider windows. Second, the measurement error in estimating the
conversion premium described in section 1.2.3 makes it a noisier measure in narrower windows.
Conversion Premium Range
Variable (-12,+12) (-12,+12) (-25,+25) (-25,+25) (-50,+50) (-50,+50)
Panel (A) Dependent Variable: Leverage t-2
ITM -0.041 0.006 0.016 0.028 0.038 0.03
(-1.11) (.14) (.78) (1.11) (1.48) (1.38)
R2 [Obs] 0.27 [66] 0.00029 [66] 0.2 [141] 0.0088 [141] 0.14 [266] 0.0071 [266]
Panel (B) Dependent Variable: Leverage t-1
ITM -0.024 0.014 0.016 0.031 0.045 0.042
(-.81) (.34) (.85) (1.20) (2.04) (2.05)
R2 [Obs] 0.33 [67] 0.0018 [67] 0.22 [139] 0.01 [139] 0.13 [268] 0.016 [268]
Panel (C) Dependent Variable: Leverage t
ITM -0.012 0.03 0.033 0.049 0.054 0.051
(-.51) (.71) (1.87) (1.84) (2.54) (2.43)
R2 [Obs] 0.37 [66] 0.0077 [66] 0.22 [141] 0.024 [141] 0.15 [268] 0.022 [268]
Panel (D) Dependent Variable: Leverage t+1
ITM -0.007 0.034 0.038 0.049 0.05 0.046
(-.33) (.77) (1.90) (1.77) (2.30) (2.13)
R2 [Obs] 0.41 [66] 0.0091 [66] 0.19 [140] 0.022 [140] 0.16 [268] 0.017 [268]
Panel (E) Dependent Variable: Leverage t+2
ITM -0.018 -0.003 0.008 0.014 0.03 0.025
(-.69) (-.08) (.29) (.57) (1.02) (1.21)
R2 [Obs] 0.18 [67] 0.0001 [67] 0.13 [143] 0.0023 [143] 0.12 [270] 0.0054 [270]
Year and Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 1.10: Non-parametric regressions for windows of conversion premium: The sample includes firm-quarter
observations between 1995 and 2010 from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database that satisfy the
following conditions: (1) have at least one convertible bond outstanding, (2) experience at least one conversion after the quarter
they show up in this table, (3) do not experience any of the events listed in Table 1.11 such as conversion, call, repurchase, etc.
in neither the past four quarters, nor the next four quarters, and (4) fall in each of the three conversion premium windows of
(-12,+12) in columns (1) and (2), (-25,+25) in columns (3) and (4), or in (-50,+50) in columns (5) and (6). The table presents
non-parametric regression results, where the depended variable in each regression is the book leverage. ITM (In The Money) is
a dummy variable which switches on when stock price is above conversion price, i.e, conversion option is in the money. Leverage
levels are de-trended and deseasonalized using year and quarter fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
In sum, I find robust evidence of pre-balancing using different parametric and non-parametric model
specifications. Firms tend to increase their leverage level preemptively by 10% to 21% relative to their
current leverage level as soon as they anticipate a drop in leverage. This finding is consistent with the
trade-off theory stating that managers actively rebalance their firms’ capital structure towards a target. I
find that they not only rebalance, but also pre-balance when they anticipate a change in leverage in the near
future.
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1.5.4 Heterogeneity in Leverage Response : Quantile Analysis
In this section, I examine whether the pre-balancing effect which we found in the previous section is a
universal phenomena for all firms, or if it varies as a function of their leverage ratio. I repeat the exercise
in the previous section by estimating a quantile regression version of the model in equation (1.4), adopting
a polynomial of order one as well as year, quarter and industry fixed effects. The main difference is that in
the previous section, β1 was an estimate for the average treatment effect (ATE), whereas here it estimates
the quantile treatment effect (QTE) (Koenker (2005)) for quantiles of the book leverage. In the interest of
saving space, I focus only on the β1 and skip reporting estimation results for the full model.
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Figure 1.3: Quantile treatment effect (QTE) for leverage response : The sample includes all firm-quarter
observations between 1995 and 2010 from non-financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database that satisfy the
following conditions: (1) have at least one convertible bond outstanding, (2) experience at least one conversion after the quarter
they show up in this table, and (3) do not experience any of the events listed in Table 1.11 such as conversion, call, repurchase,
etc. in neither the past four quarters, nor the next four quarters. The solid line in this figure presents pre-balancing coefficient
in different quantiles of the leverage level, before crossing the conversion price ( ITM coefficient for quantile version of the
results in Table 1.9), dotted lines present 90% confidence intervals for this coefficient and dashed line is the OLS estimation
result for the same coefficient.
Figure 1.3 presents the pre-balancing coefficient, β1, for quantiles of conditional leverage ratio in equation
(1.4). The horizontal axis denotes quantiles of the conditional book leverage, and the vertical axis shows
the coefficient value. Overall, we observe a hump-shaped curve with a maximum of 0.13 around the 70th
percentile. This figure shows that the pre-balancing coefficient increases in leverage for a wide range of low
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and medium conditional leverage ratios. Specifically, the pre-balancing coefficient rises from β1,τ=0.05 = 0.03
to β1,τ=0.70 = 0.13. For high leverage ratios the pattern reverses. The increase in the conditional leverage
ratio falls from β1,τ=0.70 = 0.13 to β1,τ=0.95 = 0.0.05.
The increasing section of Figure 1.3 may be seen as a counter example for the debt overhang hypothesis
(Myers (1977), Lang et al. (1996), Hennessy (2004)). In our context, the debt overhang hypothesis would
predict a decreasing pattern for pre-balancing as a function of leverage. This is true because as we move
from lower to higher conditional leverage levels on the horizontal axis, the increase in conditional leverage
ratio implies that the firm’s existing size of debt is larger relative to the total assets. The larger size of
debt, which increases expected financial distress costs, makes it harder for the firms to raise new debt. This
then predicts that the company has to forgo more new positive investment projects. Therefore, during the
pre-balancing the amount of new debt or equivalently the increase in the leverage ratio must be a decreasing
function in current size of debt. This is in contradiction to the increasing section of the Figure 1.3, which
represents a wide range of conditional leverage ratios between the 5th to the 70th percentiles. As we see in
this figure, it is only in high conditional leverage ratios, (i.e. above the 70th percentile,) that consistent with
debt overhang prediction, the pre-balancing is decreasing in conditional leverage.
Note that my identification strategy rules out the possibility that the hump-shaped pattern in Figure
1.3 could be the result of changes in observable firm characteristics such as firm credit rating or investment
opportunities (which I control for). This is due to the fact that under a mild assumption of no discontinuity
in error terms around the conversion threshold one can assume that observations are randomly assigned
to the control and treatment groups, and therefore selection is not a concern in this design. Another such
example is the effect of the size of convertible debt issue. Essig (1991) provides evidence that the relative
size of convertible debt is larger for firms with larger leverage ratios. Therefore, one may argue that the
increasing pattern in the first part of Figure 1.3 is due to the relatively larger size of the convertible issues
for firms in higher quantiles of leverage ratio. In other words, firms pre-balance more because they have
larger issues of convertible bonds and therefore larger anticipated increases in leverage. To investigate such
possibilities, I include an additional variable Convertible Size = TotalConvertible Debt OutstandingTotal Debt in equation
(1.4). However, inclusion of the Convertible Size has virtually no impact on the hump-shaped pattern in
Figure 1.3.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
This study shows that firms actively re-balance their capital structure positions in response to both realized
and anticipated change in capital structure. Using a regression discontinuity design I find that firms pre-
balance their leverage ratio by 0.054 to 0.074 (a 16% to 21% increase relative to its previous level) in response
to an anticipated drop in leverage caused by near future voluntary debt conversion. I also show that once
an issue is voluntarily converted, the gap in the leverage ratio between converted and non-converted groups
disappears within a year. Thus, my finding is consistent with a trade-off theory of capital structure, where
firms actively re-balance and even pre-balance their capital structures toward a target.
Additionally, I find that pre-balancing in capital structure varies as a function of leverage ratio. More
specifically, a quantile treatment effect analysis indicates that pre-balancing is a hump-shaped function of
leverage ratio, with a peak around the 70th percentile of conditional leverage ratio. I argue that the upward-
sloping section of this curve which covers a wide range of low and medium leverage ratios, may be interpreted
as a counter example for the debt overhang theory.
While shedding light on how capital structure responds to an anticipated change, this study also provides
opportunities for addressing new questions. One such question concerns the effect of an anticipated change
in capital structure on other financial policy choices such as cash holding policy, dividend policy, and so
on. Another issue that is still an open question according to Graham and Leary (2011) concerns the value
relevance of capital structure. Given that most of the current studies find a flat value function one wonders
whether capital structure is truly irrelevant or whether better identification strategies may result in different
conclusions? A regression discontinuity design to study stock return changes around discontinuity threshold
(which has been recently used by other researchers (Cuat et al. (forthcoming))), would provide an effective
identification strategy to answer this question. Additionally, another question concerns real and financial
implications of a change in capital structure. With realized conversions in data exogenous to firm’s decisions,
one could potentially answer this question in a local average treatment effects analysis (LATE) design
(Angrist and Pischke (2008)) using ITM as the treatment assignment indicator and actual conversion as the
compliance (treatment-taking) indicator. These questions are all on my future research agenda.
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1.7 Appendix
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Figure 1.4: Leverage discontinuity at conversion price: The sample includes firm-quarter observations from non-
financial firms in the merged FISD-COMPUSTAT database between 1995 and 2010 that satisfy the following conditions: (1)
have at least one convertible bond outstanding, (2) experience at least one conversion after the quarter they show up in this
table, and (3) do not experience any of the events listed in Table 1.11 such as conversion, call, repurchase, etc. in neither the
past four quarters, nor the next four quarters . Dots denote local averages for each bin of book leverage, where bin bandwidth
= 6.13%, and two separate linear fits on each side of zero conversion premium (or equivalently where stock price = conversion
price).
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Frequency of Issues per Action-Firm
Code Action 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
B Balance of Issue Called 278 13 291
C Issue Converted 351 13 1 365
E Entire Issue Called 545 17 2 564
I Initial Offering of An Issue 1633 461 46 14 4 1 1 2160
II Initial Offering Increase 2 2
IL Initial Load 310 14 1 325
IM Issue Matured 354 11 365
IRM Issue Remarketed 3 3
IRP Issue Repurchased 464 30 494
L Release Of Property 1 1
N Not Available 10 10
O Optional Sinking Fund Increase 6 6
OA Over-Allotment 871 43 1 915
P Part of an Issue Called 76 76
PIK Pay-in-kind 20 20
R Reorganization 122 21 3 1 1 148
REV Review 1755 184 13 2 1 1955
RO Reopening 21 21
S Sinking Fund Payment 226 1 227
SA Sale of Asset 14 1 1 16
T Issue Tendered 141 18 1 160
X Issue Exchanged 901 63 5 4 1 1 975
Table 1.11: Frequency of events in FISD : This tables presents frequency of issues for each firm-year observation, for
the sample of non-financial firms which have a convertible bonds outstanding.
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Industry Converted Total Conversion Median Beta
Issued Prob. (%) Leverage
Chemicals & Allied Products 34 781 4.35 0.21 1.28
Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 10 548 1.82 0.39 0.52
Business Schools 19 523 3.63 0.15 1.36
Oil and Gas Extraction 26 418 6.22 0.28 0.66
Industrial & Commercial Machinery 7 235 2.98 0.19 1.06
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 9 206 4.37 0.19 1.18
Communications 22 206 10.68 0.41 1.13
Health Services 5 206 2.43 0.33 1.29
Primary Metal Industries 8 169 4.73 0.24 0.96
Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 7 146 4.79 0.15 0.8
Eating & Drinking Establishments 5 143 3.50 0.31 1.06
Measure, Analyze & Control Instruments 4 122 3.28 0.19 1.13
Transportation Equipment 3 104 2.88 0.30 0.9
Air Transportation 2 104 1.92 0.39 1.44
Apparel & Accessory Stores 3 97 3.09 0.17 1.11
Printing & Publishing 2 92 2.17 0.23 0.92
Miscellaneous Retail 1 92 1.09 0.28 0.99
Coal Mining 5 77 6.49 0.33 0.93
Agricultural - Crops 0 73 0.00 0.33 0.61
Home Furniture, Furnishings & Equip Stores 1 63 1.59 0.22 1.06
Rail road Transportation 2 58 3.45 0.30 1.1
Engineering, Accounting, Research Services 2 54 3.70 0.13 1.28
Fabricated Metal Products 1 52 1.92 0.31 0.76
General Merchandise 1 51 1.96 0.29 0.95
Stone, Clay, Glass & Concrete 1 49 2.04 0.38 0.67
Building Contractors 1 44 2.27 0.45 1.14
Wholesale trade-Non-durable goods 3 40 7.50 0.28 0.98
Construction- Special Trade 1 33 3.03 0.23 0.38
Water Transportation 0 29 0.00 0.46 1.07
Heavy Construction 2 26 7.69 0.22 0.74
Total 187 4,853 3.85 0.28 0.98
Table 1.12: Frequency of Issuance and Conversion for Industries : This tables presents frequency of issuance and
conversion of convertible bonds in FISD as well as average leverage and beta for all industries between 1995 and 2010. Industry
classification is based on two-digit SIC codes. Industries are sorted based on Total Issued column, which indicates total number
of convertible bonds for each industry between 1995 and 2010
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Chapter 2
Risk Averse Cartels
2.1 Introduction
In their pioneering theoretical model of collusion under demand uncertainty, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)
show that when demand is independently and identically distributed over time, and firms observe demand
before taking actions, collusion is harder to support when demand is higher. The intuition is compelling: the
period incentive to cheat on the cartel rises with demand, but expected continuation payoffs are unchanged.
While this setting is stark, Kandori (1991) establishes that the essence of the Rotemberg and Saloner result
extends to serially-correlated demand—effectively, the period incentive to cheat on the cartel is more sensitive
to current market conditions than are continuation payoffs. Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) establish
related results for deterministic cyclical demand—collusion is hardest to support at the peak of a cycle.
Bagwell and Staiger (1997) generalize these results melding a Markov demand growth process on top of the
i.i.d. transitory shocks.
In contrast to this robust theoretical prediction, we have Scherer (1980)’s summary of his empirical
work: “Yet it is precisely when business conditions turn sour that price cutting runs most rampant among
oligopolistic with high fixed costs,” and Aiginger et al. (1998)’s survey of 113 experts found that most believed
that price wars are more likely when demand is low. Staiger and Wolak (1992) assert “the conventional
empirical wisdom [is] that tacit collusion tends to break down when business conditions turn sour.” Empirical
studies providing support for the premise that collusion is harder to support in downturns include Porter
(1985), Scherer and Ross (1990), Suslow (2005), and Ellison (1994). However, Domowitz et al. (1987),
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Borenstein and Shepard (1996) provide empirical evidence consistent
with cartels being more likely to breakdown in booms. This empirical research primarily focuses on prices
and price-cost margins, and with output competition, procyclical price-cost margins are consistent with
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collusion being more difficult to support when demand is high. Still, even among commodity cartels, there is
evidence that collusion is difficult to support in downturns. For example, the two largest production wars in
OPEC occurred in 1986 and 1997 when demand was low; in 1986, Saudi Arabia increased production from
2 to 5 mbpd when the price fell under $10.
One approach to trying to reconcile observations such as these is to argue that the central premise of
Rotemberg and Saloner is wrong, and that firms can only imperfectly monitor collusion, for example, seeing
equilibrium prices, but not demand realizations. Green and Porter (1984) and the vast imperfect monitoring
literature that followed takes this approach. In this literature, low prices trigger punishment and price wars
because cartel members cannot distinguish whether they are due to low demand or to cheating by a defecting
cartel member.
We take a different approach. We return to the insights implicit in Scherer (1980), and explore collusion by
risk-averse cartel members who face positive fixed operating costs. Our premise that cartel members are risk
averse captures the observation that many commodity cartels consist of “country cartels” that do not care
about profits per se, but rather about the utility their citizens derive from those profits. For example, OPEC
is a cartel of oil-producing countries; and similar country cartels have existed in many manufacturing and
commodity cartels (natural resources such as minerals, chemicals, raw materials, metals, etc., including sugar,
rayon, zinc, aluminum, copper, coffee, tea, and so on; see Suslow (2005) for an extensive list.).1 Because most
commodity cartels choose output levels, we model output competition rather than price competition when
defections from cartel quotas result in reversion to static Nash equilibrium output levels, but we otherwise
focus on the classical i.i.d. demand, constant marginal cost environment studied by Rotemberg and Saloner.
We measure the extent of collusion as captured by the ratio of output relative to monopoly levels that can
be supported in different demand states.
When cartel members are risk averse (with power utility), they value a marginal dollar of profit by more
when profits are lower. One might therefore conjecture that risk aversion alone could be enough to make
collusion more difficult to support in low demand states. This conjecture is false: to overturn the Rotemberg-
Saloner result that higher demand always makes it more difficult for firms to collusively restrain output, cartel
members must not only be sufficiently risk averse, but fixed operating costs of production must be sufficiently
1Among non-country cartels, one might argue either that cartel members inherit the risk aversion of managers, or that
financially-constrained firms with large debt levels, in effect, are risk averse, valuing a marginal dollar in bad times by more
because it may stave off liquidation. Consistent with this, Busse (2002) provides evidence that price wars in airline industry
are unilaterally initiated by financially troubled firms.
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high. Fixed operating costs magnify the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of revenues in
bad times, sharply raising the period incentive to cheat on the cartel when demand is especially low. More
provocatively, we establish that collusion is easiest to support when demand is intermediate, neither too
low, nor too high. The fixed costs of production mean that preferences effectively exhibit decreasing relative
risk-aversion. Thus, when demand is especially low, the very high marginal valuation of an additional dollar
of profit induced by the fixed operating costs make the incentive to cheat on the cartel very high; and when
demand is much higher, the decreasing risk aversion implies that the classical effect dominates—as demand
increases, there are more dollars to be gained from cheating on the cartel. We further establish that although
the incentive to cheat on the cartel is a U-shaped function of the level of demand, the incentive rises more
sharply in low demand states than in higher ones. This U-shaped predicted relationship between demand and
the ability to collusively support restrain output levels suggests that efforts to tease out the true relationship
in the data must be more nuanced; and that this relationship may account for the somewhat mixed empirical
findings.
We then establish that greater fixed operating costs or risk aversion make it harder to support collusion
when demand is low, but easier to support collusion when demand is high. Greater fixed costs or risk aversion
raising the net continuation payoff from collusion by enhancing the threatened Nash reversion punishment
for cheating on the cartel. However, greater fixed costs or risk aversion also raise the potential period utility
gains from cheating on the cartel. The impact of higher operating costs on period incentives dominates when
demand is especially low, making collusion more difficult to support; but the higher net continuation payoffs
dominate when demand is especially high, making collusion easier to support.
We next present the model and analysis. A conclusion follows. Proofs are in an appendix.
2.2 The Model
Our framework features an infinitely repeated output game played by two agents 1 and 2 (e.g., country
members of OPEC) that sell a homogeneous good in a market where demand evolves stochastically according
to an i.i.d. process.2 Date t demand is given by
Pt = θt −Qt, (2.1)
2Extensions to N > 2 agents are routine.
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where θt is identically and independently distributed, with associated distribution function F (θ) on its
positive support [a, b], with a > 0, and Qt = q
1
t + q
2
t is aggregate output. Without loss of generality, we
normalize the constant marginal costs of production to zero. The agents also incur fixed operating costs
each period of c ≥ 0, where c ≤ a29 .
In the classical Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) framework, the agents are risk-neutral firms whose period
payoffs equal their period profits, U i(piit)) = pi
i
t. Thus, the marginal value that a firm derives from a dollar of
profit does not vary with the level of profit, and fixed operating costs are irrelevant for a firm’s decision making
(assuming that exit is not a strategic consideration). We depart from this classical setting to investigate
collusion by risk-averse agents that face positive fixed operating costs. Agent i derives period utility from
profit piit of U
i(piit) = (pi
i
t)
α, where 0 < α ≤ 1. For simplicity, we assume that each period, a cartel member
consumes its period profits, i.e., there is no saving and borrowing. As a result, a cartel member values an
extra dollar of profit by more when profits are lower. Moreover, fixed operating costs enter decision making
non-trivially, as they especially magnify the marginal value of an additional dollar in bad times. Firms use
a common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) to discount future payoffs.
We focus on the maximal period collusion profits that can be supported by threats to revert to the
non-cooperative static Nash equilibrium outputs forever if a cartel member ever deviates from their collusive
agreement. We do this because we want agents to be able to provide their citizens positive consumption in
all states of the world. Our focus on output competition rather than price competition together with the
assumption that a
2
9 > c ensures that the profits from Nash outputs always cover the period fixed operating
costs, providing citizens subsistence consumption. Harsher threats are unlikely to be credible (for instance,
failing to provide a minimal subsistence level might result in the state’s overthrow). As important, output
competition captures our real world motivating example of a country commodity cartel, in which cartel
members clearly choosing levels of outputs rather than prices.
After observing period demand, the two cartel members simultaneously choose outputs. Define qC(θ) to
be the collusive firm output supported along the equilibrium path when the demand shock is θ. Given that
deviations from collusive outputs result in static Nash outputs in the future, an agent that cheats on the
cartel agreement will produce the qF (θ) that maximizes period profit, and hence period utility, solving
max
q′(θ)
(θ − qC(θ)− q′(θ))q′(θ)− c⇒ qF (θ) = (θ − qC(θ))/2.
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Let piC(θ) = (θ − 2qC(θ))qC(θ)− c and piF (θ) = (θ − q(θ))2/4− c denote the respective period profits from
cooperating and cheating on the cartel, and let qP (θ) = θ/3 be the Nash output and piP (θ) = θ2/9 − c
be the associated Nash period profit. Finally, let UC ≡ E[U(piC(θ))] be the expected period utility from
cooperation along the equilibrium path, and let UP ≡ E[U(piP (θ))] be the expected period utility along the
punishment path. Then, for each given demand shock θ, incentive compatibility requires
U(piC(θt)) +
(
β
1− β
)
UC ≥ U(piF (θt)) +
(
β
1− β
)
UP . (2.2)
Equation (2.2) can be re-arranged in terms of the “incentive to cheat”:
U(piF (θt))− U(piC(θt)) ≤
(
β
1− β
)
(UC − UP ) ≡ v. (2.3)
That is, for a cartel production schedule to be incentive compatible, the net period utility payoff from
cheating when demand is θ, U(piF (θt)) − U(piC(θt)), cannot exceed the net expected payoff from future
cooperation rather than punishment, v.
Cartel’s Problem. The cartel’s objective is to find the incentive compatible production schedule that
maximizes their joint utility along the equilibrium path,
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1E[U(piCi (θt)) + U(pi
C
j (θt))]. With power
utility, we can write the cartel’s problem as
Max
q(θ)
∫ b
a
(q(θ)(θ − 2q(θ))− c)α dF (θ) (2.4)
s.t. (
(θ − q(θ))2
4
− c)α − ((θ − 2q(θ))q(θ)− c)α ≤
(
β
1− β
)
(UC − UP ) ≡ v, ∀ θ ∈ [a, b].
We measure the cartel’s ability to support collusion when demand is θ by the ratio qC(θ)/qm(θ) ≥ 1, i.e.,
by the ratio of output relative to monopoly levels. A higher ratio indicates that collusion is more difficult to
support in that demand state. It is important to note that most empirical researchers measure collusion in
price-cost margins (which with constant marginal costs reduces to measuring collusion in prices). Obviously,
if price-cost margins fall with θ, then qC(θ)/qm(θ) also rises with θ. However, with output competition,
qC(θ)/qm(θ) can rise with θ, indicating a reduced ability of the cartel to support collusion in higher demand
states, even though price-cost margins rise uniformly with θ. Phrased differently, with output competition,
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the procyclical price-cost margins found empirically do not imply that collusion is easier to support in high
demand states.
For the special case of linear utility, U(pii(θt)) = pii(θt), the cartel’s objective reduces to the output-
competition variant of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). In that setting, it immediately follows that the
incentive to cheat increases in θ, as with i.i.d. demand, expected continuation payoffs do not vary with θ,
but the current payoffs from cheating on the cartel rise when the stakes are higher. As a result, qC(θ)/qm(θ)
is constant when demand is low enough that monopoly profits can be supported, and is strictly increasing
when demand is high enough that threats to deviate to Nash outputs cannot support monopoly profits.
One might conjecture that risk-aversion alone, i.e., α < 1, would be enough to reverse the result that it is
more difficult for the cartel to collusively restrict output toward monopoly levels when demand is high, i.e.,
to reverse the result that qC(θ)/qm(θ) rises with θ. That is, one might conjecture that since the marginal
utility derived from another dollar of profit is higher when profits are lower, collusion might be more difficult
to support when demand is low and cartel members are sufficiently risk averse. This conjecture is false. The
following proposition establishes necessary conditions for it to be harder to support collusion when demand
is low than when it is high: not only must agents be risk averse, α < 1, but they must also have positive
fixed costs of operation, c > 0.
Proposition 1 Suppose that either c = 0 or α = 1. Then over-production relative to monopoly levels rises
with the level of demand, i.e., qC(θ)/qm(θ) is non-decreasing in θ.
Thus, both non-zero fixed operating costs and risk-aversion are necessary for overproduction not to rise
with θ. Intuition for why more than risk aversion is required can be gleaned from looking at those demand
states θ where the net value of future cooperation v is high enough that the IC constraint is slack. For such
θ, the cartel’s optimization problem simplifies to a point-wise maximization of the objective. The associated
first-order condition is
(q(θ)(θ − 2q(θ))− c)α−1 (θ − 4q) = 0,
with solution qC(θ) = θ/4. The two agents jointly produce the monopoly output, θ/2, and each earns half of
the monopoly profits net of operating costs, θ2/8− c; and the associated fink output is 3θ/8, which delivers
profits of piF (θ) = 9θ2/64− c. To see how the incentives to cheat on the cartel hinge on the level of demand,
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the extent of risk aversion and the fixed operating costs, define the (period) incentive to cheat on monopoly
output as
f(θ;α, c) = U(piF (θ))− U(piC(θ)) =
(
9θ2
64
− c
)α
−
(
θ2
8
− c
)α
. (2.5)
When there are no fixed costs, f(θ, α, c = 0) simplifies to
f(θ;α, c = 0) =
(
9θ2
64
)α
−
(
θ2
8
)α
=
(
θ2
64
)α
(9α − 8α) ,
which rises with θ.In essence the extent of risk aversion scales the period incentive to cheat on the cartel,
preserving monotonicity in θ. A similar result holds when monopoly output cannot be supported. Relatedly,
when α = 1 the incentive to cheat is a quadratic increasing function of θ.
We now show that for the incentive to cheat on the cartel not to rise with the level of demand, the
impact of risk aversion must be higher in low demand states than high, i.e., preferences induced by the
fixed operating costs must exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion. The fixed costs of production mean that
preferences effectively take a subsistence utility form, and the associated Arrow-Pratt measure of relative
risk-aversion is RRA(W ) = −WU ′′(W )/U ′(W ) = (1 − α) WW−c , which decreases in W if and only if both
c > 0 and α < 1. Then, when demand is low, the very high marginal valuation of an additional dollar
of profit induced by the fixed operating costs cause the incentives to cheat on the cartel to rise further
when demand drops lower, and agents become even more desperate for another marginal dollar of profits.
In contrast, when demand is much higher, the decreasing risk aversion implies that risk aversion matters
less, with the result that the standard effect dominates—as demand increases, there are more dollars to be
gained from cheating on the cartel. Putting these two observations together suggests that the incentive to
cheat on the cartel will be a U-shaped function of the level of demand, θ. We now formalize this intuition.
We also begin to answer the question of exactly where the separation between good and bad times occurs.
The theorem shows that to deliver the U-shaped relationship, agents must have intermediate levels of risk
aversion: for the incentive to cheat on the cartel not to rise monotonically with θ, agents must be sufficiently
risk averse; and for the incentive not to fall monotonically with θ, they must not be too risk averse.
Theorem 1 There exist critical levels of risk aversion, α(c) and α¯(c), indexed by the fixed costs c, such that
if and only if cartel members have intermediate levels of risk aversion, α(c) < α < α¯(c) < 1, then f is a
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U-shaped function of θ, achieving a minimum at θˆ(α, c) ∈ (a, b). That is, f ′(θ) < 0 for θ < θˆ(α, c), and
f ′(θ) > 0 for θ > θˆ(α, c). Further, α(c), α¯(c) and θˆ(α, c) rise with the fixed cost c, and θˆ(α, c) increases in
risk aversion α.
The proof shows that there is a unique intermediate demand level θˆ that minimizes the incentive to cheat.
As demand falls below θˆ, the incentive to cheat rises due to the high marginal valuation of another dollar
of profit; and as demand rises above θˆ, so too does the incentive to cheat due to the greater profit that can
be gained. Further, the comparative statics reveal that when agents are more risk averse or fixed costs are
greater,demand does not have to be as bad for the incentive to cheat on the cartel to begin to rise as demand
drops lower.
Monopoly outputs are supportable when the period benefit from cheating, f , is less than the expected
net value of future cooperation, v, which is independent of θ. When f is a U-shaped function of θ, it directly
follows that monopoly outputs can only be sustained for intermediate values of demand whenever cartel
members are neither so patient that they can support monopoly outputs in every state, nor so impatient
that they can support monopoly outputs in no state (see Figure 2.1). Corollary 1 formalizes the necessary
conditions.
Corollary 1 There exist β, β¯ with β < β¯ such that if and only if β ∈ [β, β¯] the cartel can support monopoly
profits only if demand is neither too low nor too high: If and only if β ∈ [β, β¯], there exist θ(β), θ¯(β) with
a < θ(β) < θ¯(β) < b such that monopoly profits can be supported if and only if θ ∈ [θ(β), θ¯(β)].
We have shown that there are two forces driving cartel away from supporting monopoly outputs: temp-
tations rooting from the larger potential profit gain when times are good, and desperateness for an extra
dollar of profits when times are bad. But, which force is stronger? Proposition 2 shows that the ability to
support collusion drops off more quickly when demand falls below θˆ than when it rises past θˆ, i.e., the left
branch of f is steeper than the right branch.
Proposition 2 Consider any θ1 < θ2 such that f(θ1) = f(θ2). Then |f ′(θ1)| > |f ′(θ2)|.
The intuition for Proposition 2 devolves from the increasing desperation implicit in Scherer (1980)’s
summary that “Yet it is precisely when business conditions turn sour that price cutting runs most rampant
among oligopolistic with high fixed costs.” Proposition 2 goes beyond Theorem 1. Theorem 1 showed that the
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Figure 2.1: Incentive to Cheat Function Inside Monopoly Support Region: f(θ;α, c) as a function of θ. Parameters
are: α = 1/3 and c = 1/9.
incentive to cheat on monopoly output rises not only when demand is larger, but also when market conditions
turn sour. Proposition 2 documents an asymmetry in the slopes of the incentive to cheat function, which
results in a narrower range for monopoly support in bad times than in good times. Put differently, θˆ is
always closer to θ than to θ¯.
We now characterize output levels following demand realizations—both high and low—that are sufficiently
extreme that the cartel cannot support monopoly outputs. To prevent agents from cheating, cartel output
must be increased to a level that makes agents indifferent between cheating and cooperation. More formally,
at each θ ∈ [a, θ]⋃[θ¯, b] incentive compatible quotas, q(θ), solve
(
(θ − q(θ))2
4
− c)α − ((θ − 2q(θ))q(θ)− c)α =
(
β
1− β
)
(UC − UP ) ≡ v. (2.6)
We show that the incentive to cheat outside the monopoly support region falls with the level of production
relative to the monopoly production level. Define z ≡ q(θ)/θ to be the normalized production level: z is an
index for overproduction relative to monopoly output, as 4z = q(θ)/(θ/4) = q(θ)/qM (θ). When monopoly
output can be supported, there is no overproduction, so that z = 1/4; and when the cartel breaks down and
agents revert to Nash outputs, then z = 1/3. Therefore, outside the monopoly support region the feasible
levels of collusion have 1/4 < z < 1/3, and profits decrease in z.
46
Rewrite the left-hand side of the IC constraint (2.6) in terms of z and call it H(z, θ):
H(z, θ) =
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)α
− (θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α . (2.7)
When z = 1/4, then H(1/4, θ;α, c) reduces to the period incentive to cheat on monopoly output, f(θ;α, c).
As in Theorem 1, one can show that for every z ∈ (1/4, 1/3), the period incentive to cheat, H(z, θ), is a
U-shaped function of θ. Proposition 3 shows that when demand realizations make it more attractive to cheat
on the cartel, agents must reduce this attraction by increasing output relative to the monopoly level, but
that output increases become less and less effective at reducing this incentive. Further, collusion is harder
to sustain both for more extreme low demand realizations and for more extreme high demand realizations,
requiring greater overproduction:
Proposition 3 Outside the monopoly support region [θ, θ¯], the period incentive to cheat is a continuous
decreasing, convex function of output relative to monopoly levels: ∂H(z,θ)∂z < 0, and
∂2H(z,θ)
∂z2 > 0. Further,
overproduction relative to monopoly output increases when demand is further from the monopoly support
region: ∂
(
q(θ)
qM (θ)
)
/∂(θ − θ) > 0 for θ > θ, and ∂
(
q(θ)
qM (θ)
)
/∂(θ − θ¯) > 0 for θ > θ¯.
One might conjecture that when the fixed costs of production, c, are higher, or cartel members are more
risk averse (lower α), it becomes more difficult to support collusion in every demand state. The intuition
underlying such a conjecture is that such changes raise the period utility gain from cheating on any given
level of output. This conjecture is false. In essence, while the intuition is correct, it is also incomplete.
The conjecture that greater fixed costs or increased risk aversion make collusion harder to support would
follow directly if the net continuation payoffs from collusion versus punishment did not increase. However,
as c is increased (or as agents become more risk averse), the threat to punish cheating on the cartel by
reverting to Nash equilibrium outputs becomes harsher relative to the gain from a given level of cooperation.
That is, greater fixed costs or risk aversion can raise the net continuation payoff from collusion rather than
punishment. If, indeed, v rises by enough with greater operating costs or risk aversion to offset the increased
period incentive to cheat on the cartel, then greater collusion may be facilitated.
A maintained assumption in the two propositions below is that increases in operating costs c or in risk
aversion (reductions in α) do not uniformly raise or lower the incentive to cheat on the cartel. That is, when
operating costs or risk aversion is higher then collusion is easier to support in some demand states, and
harder in others. We then establish a single-crossing property characterizing which states collusion is easier
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Figure 2.2: Comparative Statics of the Effect of Risk Aversion: Dashed (solid) line presents the ratio of cartel-to-
monopoly output for more (less) risk averse agents (α2 = 2/5 < α1 = 1/2). Other parameters: c =
1
9
, β = 0.43, θ ∈ [1, 5].
to support. An exhaustive numerical analysis confirms that this maintained assumption holds whenever
demand is uniformly distributed (and the monopoly support region is interior). Indeed, we have been unable
to construct a counter-example.
Proposition 4 Consider α2 < α1. Then outside the monopoly support region, more risk averse agents find
it harder to support collusion in bad times, but easier in good times: For α2 < α1, there exists a θ
∗ such that
for all θ ≤ θ∗, if z2(θ) > 1/4, then z2(θ) > z1(θ); and for all θ > θ∗, if z1(θ) > 1/4 then z2(θ) < z1(θ).
Proposition 5 Consider two levels of fixed costs of production, c2 > c1. Then outside the monopoly support
region, greater fixed costs make it harder to support collusion in bad times, but easier in good times: For
c2 > c1, there exists a θ
∗ such that for all θ ≤ θ∗, if z2(θ) > 1/4, then z2(θ) > z1(θ); and for all θ > θ∗, if
z1(θ) > 1/4 then z2(θ) < z1(θ).
The key to these proofs is to show that the impact of an increase in c or in risk aversion on the period
gain from cheating, H(z, θ) falls with θ for a fixed z = q(θ)/θ, i.e., that ∂
2H(z,θ;c)
∂c∂θ < 0. Hence, if we ever
have H1(z
∗, θ∗) = H2(z∗, θ∗), then it is unique.
Numerically, we find that whenever demand is uniformly distributed, and agents are sufficiently risk
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Figure 2.3: Comparative Statics of the Effect of Fixed Cost of Operation: Dashed (solid) line presents the ratio of
cartel-to-monopoly output for lower (higher) fixed costs (c2 = 1/9 > c1 = 1/13). Other parameters: α = .5, β = .4, θ ∈ [1, 5].
averse with high enough operating costs that the monopoly support region is interior, then continuation
payoffs always rise with c or with risk aversion by amounts that, consistent with these figures and the two
propositions, give rise to asymmetric effects on the cartel’s ability to support collusion. That is, we find that
the effect of an increase in c or reduction in α on the increased incentive to cheat dominates the impact on
net continuation payoffs for sufficiently low demand shocks where agents are especially desperate for another
dollar of revenue. However, net continuation payoffs rise with increased operating costs and increased risk
aversion, and this effect dominates when demand is sufficiently high, making collusion easier to sustain.
These results reflect the induced decreasing relative risk aversion in preferences—the effect of an increase in
operating costs or risk aversion on the period utility gain from cheating on a given level of collusion falls as
demand, and hence profits, rise.
Asymmetric cartels. Although we do not analyze it formally, Propositions 4 and 5 have suggestive
implications for how heterogeneous agents with different levels of fixed operating costs or risk aversion
should collude. For example, Saudi Arabia likely has lower fixed operating costs than most other OPEC
cartel members. Then the propositions would suggest that Saudi Arabia should have a lower share of output
in low demand states (where high operating cost cartel members find collusion more difficult to sustain for
a given output share), but a higher share of output when demand is high (and high operating cost cartel
members mind ceding share by less, and are willing to do so to in order to obtain a greater share in low
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demand states where they care more about their share). It follows that the low operating cost or less risk
averse cartel member’s output should be more sensitive to the level of demand than is the output of higher
operating cost or more risk averse cartel members. Thus, Saudi Arabia should be the swing producer, with
relatively much lower outputs in bad times, and relatively much higher outputs in good times, so that it
would appear as if its output is the primary driver determining cartel outcomes.
2.3 Conclusion
A robust prediction of the theoretical literature on collusion under demand uncertainty when cartel members
observe demand and can monitor each other’s actions is that collusion is more difficult when demand is higher.
In contrast to this theoretical prediction, most empirical researchers have concluded that price wars are more
common when demand is low.
We provide a simple theory of collusion by risk averse agents that face positive fixed operating costs that
can reconcile these two literatures by providing conditions under which it is most difficult for cartel members
to collusively restrict output when demand is especially low, but that it also becomes difficult to support
collusion when demand is high. The idea that cartel members are risk averse captures the observation that
many effective cartels are comprised of countries that collusively restrict output of various commodities.
Such cartels do not care directly about profits, per se, but rather care about the utility derived by the risk
averse citizens who receive those profits. Therefore, we model citizen’s preferences using a power utility
function who consume the resulting profits. As a result, the marginal value of a dollar of profit is greater
when demand, and hence profits are lower; and this high marginal valuation is further enhanced by the large
fixed operating costs that Scherer (1980) cites as playing a vital role in making collusion difficult.
We show that for aggregate cartel output relative to monopoly levels to be a U-shaped function of the
level of demand, both ingredients are necessary—cartel members must be risk averse, and operating costs
must be positive. We further establish that when cartel members are more risk averse or fixed operating
costs are higher, then it becomes more difficult to support collusion in bad demand states, but easier in
booms.
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2.4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 : When α = 1, it is immediate from Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) that q(θ)/qm(θ)
is non-decreasing in θ.
If c = 0, and the IC constraint does not bind, then qC(θ)/qm(θ) = 1. Now suppose that the IC constraint
binds, and let θ1 < θ2 be two arbitrary values of θ outside the monopoly support region. Since q
m(θ) = θ/4, to
show that q(θ)/qm(θ) increases in θ we must show that q(θ2)/θ2 > q(θ1)/θ1, where q(θi)/θi ≡ zi ∈ (1/4, 1/3).
To prove that z2 > z1, suppose instead that z1 ≥ z2. Rewrite the IC constraint in terms of zi when c = 0 as:
(
θ2i
(1− zi)2
4
)α
− (θ2i (1− 2zi)zi)α = v.
Since v is independent of θ,
(
θ21
(1− z1)2
4
)α
−
(
θ21(1− 2z1)z1
)α
=
(
θ22
(1− z2)2
4
)α
−
(
θ22(1− 2z2)z2
)α
.
Since θ1 < θ2, it follows that
( (1− z1)2
4
)α
−
(
(1− 2z1)z1
)α
>
( (1− z2)2
4
)α
−
(
(1− 2z2)z2
)α
.
Calling the four terms in this inequality from left to right as A,B,C and D, rewrite the inequality as:
A − B > C − D. Under the assumption z1 > z2, and recalling that cooperation profits decrease in z, i.e.,
(1− 2z)z decreases in z > 1/4, we have B/D < 1. Therefore, A− B > C −D implies that A−BB > C−DB >
C−D
B
B
D =
C−D
D . Therefore,
A
B >
C
D , i.e.,
( (1−z1)2
4
(1− 2z1)z1
)α
>
( (1−z2)2
4
(1− 2z2)z2
)α
,
or equivalently, (1−z1)
2
(1−2z1)z1 >
(1−z2)2
(1−2z2)z2 for z2 ≥ z1. But g(z) =
(1−z)2
(1−2z)z is a decreasing function of z, i.e.,
g′(z) < 0, a contradiction. 
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Proof of Theorem 1: The first-order condition is
f ′(θ) =2αθ
(
9
64
(
9θ2
64
− c)α−1 − 1
8
(
θ2
8
− c)α−1
)
= 0.
Solving yields
θ2
8 − c
9θ2
64 − c
= (
8
9
)
1
1−α ≡ k ⇒ θˆ = 8
√
(1− k)c
8− 9k .
Notice that k = ( 89 )
1
1−α < 89 < 1. Clearly, θ < θˆ implies that
θ2
8 − c
9θ2
64 − c
< (
8
9
)
1
1−α ⇒ 9(9θ
2
64
− c)α−1 < 8(θ
2
8
− c)α−1.
Therefore, f ′(θ) < 0. A similar argument holds for θ > θˆ.
The requirement that a < θˆ < b imposes bounds on the range of α. We require
a < θˆ = 8
√
(1− k(α))c
8− 9k(α) < b.
Solving yields the upper and lower bounds:
α¯(c) = 1 +
log(9/8)
log( 8a
2−64c
9a2−64c )
and α(c) = 1 +
log(9/8)
log( 8b
2−64c
9b2−64c )
.
Since α(x; c) = 1 + log(9/8)/ log( 8x
2−64c
9x2−64c ) is a decreasing function of x, with a limit of zero as x goes to
infinity, θˆ ∈ (a, b) exists as long as α(c) < α < α¯(c).
Finally, differentiating αˆ(c) and θˆ(α, c) with respect to c and α delivers the results:
∂αˆ(c)
∂c
=
8a2 log(9/8)
(9a2 − 64c)(a2 − 8c)
(
log(1− a29a2−64c )
)2 ≥ 0,
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which is non-negative since c < a
2
9 ; and
∂θˆ(α, c)
∂α
= − 2
2α−1
α−1 9
1
1−α log
[
9
8
]
c
(α− 1)2
(
2
3α
α−1 9
1
1−α − 9
)2√(( 98 ) 11−α−1)c
2
3α
α−1 9
1
1−α−9
< 0;
∂θˆ(α, c)
∂c
=
4
c
√√√√(( 89) 11−α − 1)c
8
1
1−α 9
α
α−1 − 8
> 0. 
Proof of Corollary 1: Let θ < θ¯ be the two roots of f(θ;α, c) = v when it has two roots for a ≤ θ ≤ b.
Note that v is independent of θ. Since f(θ;α, c) is a U-shaped function of θ (Theorem 1), for intermediate
values of θ where f(θ;α, c) < v the IC constraint (2.3) is slack. Therefore, monopoly profits can be supported
for θ ∈ [θ, θ¯].
For f(θ;α, c) = v to have two roots, v can be neither too small nor too large. Since v ≡
(
β
1−β
)
(UC−UP ),
there is one-to-one mapping between v and β. Thus, we must bound β appropriately: β must exceed the β
that solves
f(θˆ;α, c) =
(
β
1− β
)
(UC − UP ),
and be less than the β¯ that solves
Min{f(a;α, c), f(b;α, c)} =
(
β¯
1− β¯
)
(UC − UP ).
Hence, f(θ;α, c) = v has two roots for θ ∈ [a, b] if and only if β ∈ [β, β¯]. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We must show that −f ′(θ1) > f ′(θ2), i.e.,
−2αθ1
(
9
64
(
9θ21
64
− c
)α−1
− 1
8
(
θ21
8
− c
)α−1)
> 2αθ2
(
9
64
(
9θ22
64
− c
)α−1
− 1
8
(
θ22
8
− c
)α−1)
,
or equivalently that
2αθ1
(
− 9
64
(
9θ21
64
− c
)α−1
+
1
8
(
θ21
8
− c
)α−1)
+ 2αθ2
(
− 9
64
(
9θ22
64
− c
)α−1
+
1
8
(
θ22
8
− c
)α−1)
> 0.
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But follows directly from the concavity of the utility function, α < 1: 9/64 > 1/8 implies we are subtract-
ing marginal utilities evaluated at higher values, i.e., the marginal utility of cooperative payoffs exceed the
marginal utility of their cheat payoff analogues. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
∂H(z, θ)
∂z
=
1
2
αθ2
(
2(4z − 1)(θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α−1 − (1− z)(θ
2
4
(1− z)2 − c)α−1
)
.
To show ∂H(z,θ)∂z is positive, equivalently we must prove:
1− z
2(4z − 1) >
(
θ2 14 (1− z)2 − c
θ2z(1− 2z)− c
)1−α
.
Since the cheat payoff, (1 − z)2/4 always exceeds the cooperation payoff, z(1 − 2z), the right-hand side
exceeds one. Therefore, it suffices to show that
1− z
2(4z − 1) >
θ2 14 (1− z)2 − c
θ2z(1− 2z)− c .
Define c′ ≡ c/θ2 and rearrange the above inequality as
1− z
2(4z − 1) −
1
4 (1− z)2 − c′
z(1− 2z)− c′ =
1
2 (3z − 1)(z − 1 + 6c′)
2(4z − 1)(z(1− 2z)− c′) =
1
6 (3z − 1)2
2(4z − 1)(z(1− 2z)− c′) > 0,
for 1/4 ≤ z < 1/3. The last inequality follows since the above expression decreases in c′ and thus is minimized
when c′ equals its upper bound of Max(c/θ2) = (a2/9)/a2 = 1/9, implying that the denominator is positive.
To prove convexity of H, we bound the second derivative of H/α strictly away from zero (we divide by α
because the derivative of H goes to zero as α goes to zero). We also write H/α in terms of c′ = c/θ2 ∈ [0, 19 ]
to make the domain compact:
1
α
H(z;α, c′) =
1
α
[(
(1− z)2
4
− c′
)α
− ((1− 2z)z − c′)α
]
,
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with associated second derivative
1
α
d2H
dz2
=
1
4
(1− α)
[
4(4z − 1)2 ((1− 2z)z − c′)α−2 − (1− z)2
(
1
4
(1− z)2 − c′
)α−2]
(2.8)
+
1
2
[(
1
4
(1− z)2 − c′
)α−1
+ 16 ((1− 2z)z − c′)α−1
]
.
The compact domain has z ∈ [1/4, 1/3], α ∈ [0, 1] and c′ ∈ [0, 1/9]. Further, 1α d
2H
dz2 is continuous and twice
differentiable on its domain, with derivatives bounded from below, so that in an  ball around any point
(z, α, c′), 1α
d2H
dz2 cannot drop too far below its value at (z, α, c
′). Therefore, to establish convexity, it suffices
to bound 1α
d2H
dz2 strictly away from zero on an appropriately fine grid. An exhaustive search on a grid with
increments of 0.001 for z, α and c′ reveals that it achieves a lower bound of 9/2 when α = 1. See Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: 3-dimensional Plot of the Second Derivative of H/α: (a) the left panel shows H/α as a function of α and
c at z = 1/4, and (b) the right panel shows H/α as a function of α and z at c = 0.
We now establish that over-production relative to monopoly increases in θ − θ¯ for θ > θ¯; and in θ − θ,
for θ < θ. First consider any θ2 > θ1 ∈ (θ¯, b]. To establish that q(θ)/qm(θ) increases in (θ− θ¯), we show that
z2 > z1. Suppose instead that z1 > z2. We have:
H(zi, θi) =
(
θ2i
(1− zi)2
4
− c
)α
−
(
θ2i (1− 2zi)zi − c
)α
= v for i = 1, 2.
From Theorem 1 for θ > θ¯, f increases in θ, so
f(θ2;α, c) > f(θ1;α, c)⇒ H(1/4, θ2) > H(1/4, θ1).
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Also from incentive compatibility,
H(z2, θ2) = H(z1, θ1) = v,
at the premised z1 > z2, and since H(z, θ) is decreasing in z for any θ, this implies that H(z2, θ1) > H(z2, θ2).
But if H(1/4, θ2) > H(1/4, θ1) and H(z2, θ2) < H(z2, θ1) then by the intermediate value theorem there exists
a z′ with 1/4 < z′ < z2 such that H(z′, θ2) = H(z′, θ1), a contradiction of θ2 > θ1 and z′ < 1/3.
An identical proof by contradiction establishes that if θ1 < θ2 < θ, then z1 > z2. That is, z1 < z2 would
imply H(z2, θ2) = H(z1, θ1) at z1 < z2 (by incentive compatibility), and hence H(z1, θ2) > H(z1, θ1), but
here, H(1/4, θ1) > H(1/4, θ2) yields a contradiction via the intermediate value theorem. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Let H1(z, θ) ≡ H(z, θ;α1, c) and H2(z, θ) ≡ H(z, θ;α2, c) for α1 > α2. We prove
that if there exists a θ such that z1(θ) = z2(θ), then it is unique. Call these values θ
∗ and z∗. To establish
this single-crossing result, we prove that for a fixed z, H1 −H2 increases in θ by showing that ∂H∂θ increases
in α. Therefore, there exists a neighborhood of θ∗ and z∗, such that for a fixed z, H1 is a steeper function
of θ than H2.
When both IC constraints bind (i.e., Hi = vi for i = 1, 2) then H1 −H2 = v1 − v2 does not vary with θ,
i.e., ∂H∂θ =
∂v
∂θ = 0.
H(z, θ) =
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)α
− (θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α = v ≡ v(α, c), (2.9)
∂H
∂θ
=
1
2
θα
(
(1− z)2
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)α−1
− 4z(1− 2z) (θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α−1) = 0.
Defining γF ≡ (1 − z)2
(
θ2 (1−z)
2
4 − c
)α−1
and γC ≡ 4z(1 − 2z)
(
θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α−1, we must have γF =
γC ≡ γ. We now prove that ∂H∂θ increases in α, i.e., ∂
2H
∂θ∂α > 0:
∂2H
∂θ∂α
=
1
2
θ
(
(1− z)2
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)α−1 − 4z(1− 2z)(θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α−1
+ α
(
(1− z)2
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)α−1
log
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)
− 4z(1− 2z)
(
θ2(1− 2z)z − c
)α−1
log
(
θ2(1− 2z)z − c
)))
.
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Substituting γF and γC , and using γF = γC ≡ γ, rewrite this as:
∂2H
∂θ∂α
=
1
2
θ
(
γF − γC + α
(
γF log
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)
− γC log
(
θ2(1− 2z)z − c
)))
=
1
2
θαγ
(
log
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)
− log
(
θ2(1− 2z)z − c
))
> 0.
The inequality holds since (1−z)
2
4 > (1−2z)z for z ∈ [1/4, 1/3). When monopoly output cannot be supported
in both environments, then ∂
2H
∂θ∂α > 0, implies that for θ > θ
∗, we need z1(θ) > z2(θ) to retrieve H1 = v1 and
H2 = v2; and θ < θ
∗ demands z1(θ) < z2(θ). 
Proof of Proposition 5: Let H1(z, θ) ≡ H(z, θ;α1, c) and H2(z, θ) ≡ H(z, θ;α2, c) for c1 < c2. We prove
that if there exists a θ such that z1(θ) = z2(θ), then it is unique. Call these values θ
∗ and z∗. To establish
this single-crossing result, we prove that for a fixed z, H1 −H2 increases in θ by showing that ∂H∂θ decreases
in c. Therefore, there exists a neighborhood of θ∗ and z∗, such that for a fixed z, H1 is a steeper function
of θ than H2.
When both IC constraints bind then ∂H∂θ =
∂v
∂θ = 0. We have
∂H
∂θ
=
1
2
θα
(
(1− z)2
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)α−1
− 4z(1− 2z) (θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α−1) = 0.
We now prove that ∂H∂θ decreases in c, i.e.,
∂2H
∂θ∂c < 0:
∂2H
∂θ∂c
=
1
2
α(1− α)θ
(
(1− z)2
(
θ2
(1− z)2
4
− c
)α−2
− 4z(1− 2z) (θ2(1− 2z)z − c)α−2) .
Substituting γF and γC , and using γF = γC ≡ γ, rewrite this as:
∂2H
∂θ∂c
=
1
2
α(1− α)θ
(
γF
θ2 (1−z)
2
4 − c
− γC
θ2(1− 2z)z − c
)
=
1
2
α(1− α)θγ
(
1
θ2 (1−z)
2
4 − c
− 1
θ2(1− 2z)z − c
)
< 0.
The inequality holds since (1−z)
2
4 > (1 − 2z)z for z ∈ [1/4, 1/3), and hence its reciprocal is smaller. When
monopoly output cannot be supported in both environments, then ∂
2H
∂θ∂α > 0, implies that for θ > θ
∗ we need
z1(θ) > z2(θ) to retrieve H1 = v1 and H2 = v2, and θ < θ
∗ demands z1(θ) < z2(θ). 
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Chapter 3
Portfolio Allocation for Public
Pension Funds
3.1 Introduction
This paper 1 examines the portfolio allocation policies of U.S. state and local government pension funds. It
presents a dynamic model of public pension fund investment choice and analyzes how risk-taking behavior
may vary with the pension plan’s characteristics. Risk is measured by the volatility of a fund’s asset portfolio
rate of return relative to the rate of return on the market value of its liabilities. The model’s implications
are examined using annual data on 125 state pension funds over the period from 2000 to 2009.
The asset allocation choice of a public pension fund is critical to understanding the problem of public
pension plan under-funding. A public pension fund’s annual investment return is typically much larger in
magnitude than its annual employer and employee contributions (Munnell and Soto (2008)). Furthermore,
the fund’s portfolio allocation across broad asset classes is the major determinant of its investment return
(Bodie (1990) and Brinson et al. (1991)). Thus, portfolio allocation policy has first-order consequences for
funding status.
Public pension fund asset allocation also is of interest because, in aggregate, it has changed drastically
over time. Figure 3.1 shows that state and local government pension funds invested almost entirely in cash
and fixed income during the 1950s, but gradually increased their allocations to equities and, more recently,
to other investments (including real estate, private equity, and hedge funds).
A benchmark policy for assessing a pension fund’s investment choice is a portfolio allocation that best
hedges or “immunizes” the risk of its liabilities. The value of a pension fund’s liabilities equals the value of
the retirement annuities that it is obligated to pay its employees and retirees. These retirement annuities
typically are linked to a worker’s wages and years of service, and most often payments are partially indexed
1An alternative version of this chapter is published as Pennacchi, G. and Rastad, M. Portfolio Allocation for Public Pension
Funds, Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, April 2011
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Figure 3.1: Portfolio Allocations of State and Local Government Pension Funds
to inflation. Hence, the value of pension liabilities is exposed to risks from real or nominal interest rate
changes and also changes in wage rates. A satisfactory analysis of portfolio choice must account for these
risks.
Portfolio allocations that deviate from the benchmark portfolio which best immunizes liabilities introduce
what we refer to as “tracking error.” This paper considers how different pension fund objectives influence the
choice of tracking error volatility and how this volatility might be influenced by the pension plan’s funding
ratio, past returns, and other plan characteristics. Our study is perhaps the first to examine the overall
asset - liability risks of a time series – cross section sample of public pension funds. We use data on state
and local government wages and various investment classes to compute a single measure of tracking error
volatility for each pension fund during each year.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly discusses related theoretical and empirical work on
the portfolio allocations of public pension funds. Our model is presented in Section III. Section IV describes
our data and variable construction, while Section V presents the empirical results. Concluding comments
are in Section VI.
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3.2 Related Literature on Public Pension Fund Portfolio
Allocation
The focus of this paper is a public pension fund’s portfolio allocation relative to a benchmark portfolio
that best hedges (immunizes) the fund’s liability risks. To evaluate liability risk, one must first determine
a method for valuing pension liabilities since they are not marketable securities. There is disagreement
on how this should be done, with the major conflict between the actuarial approach of the Government
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) and the market value approach based on finance theory. The GASB
actuarial approach discounts a pension plan’s future retirement payments using the expected rate of return
on the pension plan’s assets, rather than a discount rate appropriate to the actual risk of the pension plan’s
retirement payments.
As pointed out in many papers, most recently by Brown and Wilcox (2009), Lucas and Zeldes (2009),
and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009), valuation using the GASB actuarial standard is inconsistent with basic
financial theory and leads to moral hazard incentives in the form of “accounting arbitrage”: a pension plan
has the incentive to invest in assets with high systematic risk in order to justify a higher discount rate that
will reduce the actuarial valuation of its liabilities. Thus, we take it as a settled question that a financial
theory-based market valuation approach more accurately reflects the risk of pension liabilities.
A more subtle issue is whether the market value measure should be the pension fund’s Accumulated
Benefit Obligation (ABO) or Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO). Typically, the annual annuity payment
paid by a public pension plan to a participant is the product of the participant’s final average salary over
the last one to five years, years of credited service, and a benefit multiplier of 1% to 2.5%. The ABO is the
present value of these payments based on current years of service and the current average salary, whereas the
PBO is the present value based on current years of service and an estimated future average salary just prior to
retirement. Thus, for hedging liability risk when the public pension plan is likely to be a continuing concern,
the PBO better incorporates future risks. Therefore, we employ it to value our benchmark immunizing
portfolio.2 The effect of using PBO is to include future wage uncertainty as a component of overall liability
risk.
2Bodie (1990) argues that a corporate pension fund’s relevant obligation to be hedged is its ABO because its PBO is not
guaranteed by the corporation or by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) should the corporation fail. This
reasoning is less relevant for public pension plans. Peng (2008) argues that public plan benefits are relatively more secure
because, unlike corporate plans, municipalities typically cannot extinguish their obligations to pay pension benefits, even
following bankruptcy. As a consequence, a public-sector worker who continues to be employed is likely to receive her PBO at
retirement.
60
Black (1989) recommends that if a pension fund manager takes a narrow view by hedging the ABO
measure of pension liabilities, the pension portfolio should invest almost exclusively in duration-matching
bonds. If a broader PBO view is taken, then he recommends some allocation to stocks under the assumptions
that stock returns are positively correlated with wage growth. Peskin (2001) supports this view and finds
that a 20% to 90% allocation to equities could be optimal depending on the characteristics of a particular
public pension fund.
Lucas and Zeldes (2009) come to a similar conclusion from a model where a municipality wishes to
minimize tax distortions and pension liabilities are positively correlated with stocks. Their model predicts
that pension funds should invest more in stocks if their liabilities are more wage-sensitive, which should be
the case if a pension fund has a relatively high ratio of currently-employed pension participants to pension
plan retirees. However, they find no empirical evidence for this prediction.
3.3 A Public Pension Fund Model
Since a public pension fund’s portfolio choice will derive from its objective function, we begin by considering
possible normative and positive objectives of a public pension fund.
3.3.1 The Public Pension Fund’s Investment Objective
As will be discussed, academics and practitioners often propose different investment objectives for a public
pension plan. However, if one takes a broad Ricardian (Ricardo (1820))/Modigliani and Miller (1958b)
perspective, a municipal pension fund’s objective may be irrelevant. As discussed in Bader and Gold (2007),
arguments along the lines of Barro (1974) imply that any balance sheet (including pension fund) decision
made by a municipal government could be offset by the savings and portfolio decisions of rational private
agents. If private individuals and firms recognize the future tax consequences of a government’s (dis-) savings
and portfolio decisions, those public decisions could be over-turned by private portfolio decisions.
However, as summarized in Peskin (2001) , the conditions that enable private individuals to fully neu-
tralize government savings and portfolio decisions are unlikely to hold in practice. Heterogeneity amongst
individuals, borrowing constraints, tax distortions, and imperfect information regarding government policies
imply that public pension policies very likely effect the net tax burdens by individuals and, therefore, have
real welfare consequences.
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Due to such frictions, Peskin (2001) argues that the risk that a pension fund’s returns fail to match its
liabilities imposes intergenerational transfers because future generations are not compensated for the taxes
they will pay to cover current pension underfunding. Intergenerational equity is likely to be improved if
unfunded pension costs are covered by current, rather than future, generations of taxpayers. Unlike the
federal government, municipalities have more limited means to cope with underfunding: they cannot inflate
away the value of their liabilities via money creation. Thus, unlike the federal social security program that
operates on a pay-as-you-go basis, municipalities may want a funded pension plan to avoid unsustainable
fiscal imbalances. Peng (2008) believes this is why almost all state and local pension plans are pre-funded.
Even if pension fund deficits are covered by an immediate rise in taxes paid by the current generation
of taxpayers, risk-aversion and intra-generational equity motivate a desire to hedge pension liabilities. Not
only might a pension fund’s objective be to fund the present value of pension obligations as they accrue,
but also to reduce the uncertainty that investment returns fail to match the change in the present value of
obligations due to changing market conditions. A fully-funded pension plan whose investments immunize its
liabilities fits this ideal of minimizing tax uncertainty.3
We find this argument compelling, with one caveat. It is unlikely that a municipality’s other expenditures
for non-pension benefits are fully matched by contemporaneous tax revenues at each point in time. During
economic downturns, tax revenues (excluding pension contributions) typically fail to cover non-pension
expenditures. If the municipality wished to hedge the net tax surplus of its aggregate balance sheet, pension
investments might be chosen so that their returns outperform those of pension liabilities during economic
recessions and underperform them during economic expansions. An implication is that pension plans would
optimally choose short positions in procyclical risky assets, such as equities.
In practice, municipal governments typically do not incorporate pension fund investment decisions within
a single framework for managing their overall balance sheets. Rather, they delegate the administration of a
public pension plan to a Board of Trustees who may be appointed or may be elected by plan participants.
The Board’s scope tends to focus narrowly on the pension plan. Typically, the Board sets objectives in
the form of allocation guidelines in various asset classes, such as fixed income, equities, and alternative
investments. A supporting staff headed by an executive director may implement these objectives and/or
delegate them to external money managers whose performance is measured against market benchmarks or
peers having similar investment styles.
Peng (2008) notes that asset allocation objectives typically are chosen to meet a numerical goal for ex-
3The Lucas and Zeldes (2009) model with costly tax distortions provides these insights.
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post investment returns, rather than a desire to hedge the risk of liabilities. Asset class portfolio weights
often are chosen based on mean-variance portfolio efficiency with little regard to the risk of pension liabilities.
Consequently, pension funds usually are exposed to significant risk from changes in the market value of their
liabilities.
Why might public pension fund investment objectives have minimal connection to liability risk? A
potential explanation is that archaic GASB accounting clouds the true market valuation of pension liabilities.
Lacking a market value measure of liabilities to benchmark the market value of pension assets may discourage
hedging. Moreover, opaque accounting of pension liabilities might affect how the performance of management
is measured. Rather than, or in addition to, being judged on how the pension fund’s investments hedge the
market risk of its liabilities, the pension Board and staff’s performance may be gauged against the investment
performance of similar public pension funds. Peskin (2001) describes such a peer group benchmark as
belonging to the “traditional” approach to public pension investment management. Park (2009) argues that
such a peer group benchmark is a result of career concerns by the plan’s Board of Trustees and staff and is
reinforced by “prudent person” fiduciary standards.
3.3.2 Public Pension Fund Portfolio Choice
Given the previous discussion, we begin with a normative model that assumes a pension fund’s objective is
to maximize the utility of a representative taxpayer. We later consider an agency model where the fund’s
objective is to maximize the utility of the pension plan’s management.
The model is similar to Chen and Pennacchi (2009) , and details regarding its derivation can be found
in that paper. Let the initial date be 0, and let the end of the pension fund’s performance horizon be
date T. The interval from date 0 to T might be interpreted as the municipality’s fiscal year or a longer
period over which pension over- or under-funding has tax consequences and thereby affects the wealth of
the municipality’s residents. Since our focus is on portfolio allocation given an initial level of funding, we
assume that contributions by the pension plan’s government employer and its employees are made just prior
to date 0, as are any cash outflows to pay retirement benefits. Thus from date 0 to date T, the only changes
in the values of pension assets and liabilities derive from their market rates of return.
During the interval from dates 0 to T, the pension fund’s benchmark, which for now is assumed to be its
liabilities, Lt, satisfies
dLt
Lt
= αLdt+ σLdzL (3.1)
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where dzL is a Brownian motion process. The Appendix in Pennacchi and Rastad (2010) shows how this
rate of return process can be derived from the value of individual employees’ projected benefits and retirees’
annuities. The process depends on risks from changes in wages and changes in the value of nominal or, in
the case of Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs), inflation-indexed (real) bonds.
We assume that the pension fund can invest in a portfolio of securities that perfectly match (immunize)
the above rate of return on liabilities.4 It can also invest in n “alternative” securities, where security i ’s rate
of return satisfies
dAi,t
Ai,t
= αidt+ σidzi i = 1, ..., n (3.2)
and dzi, i = 1,. . . .,n are other correlated Brownian motions such that σLdzLσidzi = σiLdt. The σi, σL ,
and σiL are assumed to be constants. αi and αL may be time varying, as would be the case with stochastic
interest rates, but their spread, αi − αL, is assumed constant.
For the model applications that we consider, the pension fund’s optimal investments in the n alternative
securities are characterized by constant relative proportions, so that the pension fund’s portfolio choice
problem simplifies to one of choosing between the liability immunizing portfolio and a single alternative
portfolio invested in the alternative securities with constant portfolio weights δi, i=1,..,n.
5 If we let At be
the date t value of this alternative securities portfolio, then its rate of return is
dAt
At
= αAdt+ σAdzA (3.3)
whereαA ≡
∑n
i=1 δiαi, σ
2
A ≡
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 δiδjσij , and dzA ≡
∑n
i=1 (δiσi/σA) dzi.
If at date t the pension fund allocates a portfolio proportion 1 − ωt to the immunizing portfolio and a
proportion ωt to this alternative securities portfolio, then the value of the pension fund’s asset portfolio, Vt,
satisfies
dVt
Vt
= (1− ωt)dLt
Lt
+ ωt
dAt
At
(3.4)
= [(1− ωt)αL + ωtαA]dt+ (1− ωt)σLdzL + ωtσAdzA
Whenever ωt 6= 0, the fund’s return in equation (3.4) deviates from the liability immunizing portfolio’s
4Our empirical work weakens this assumption to allow for imperfect immunization.
5The appendix of Chen and Pennacchi (2009) shows that permitting multiple alternative security choices simplifies to a
single alternative portfolio choice problem.
64
return. Now define Gt ≡ Vt/Lt to be the pension fund’s date t funding ratio; that is, value of the fund’s
assets relative to that of its liabilities. At date 0, G0 =V 0 /L0 but then evolves over the interval from date
0 to date T as:
dGt
Gt
= ωt(αA − αL + σ2L − σAL)dt+ ωt(σAdzA − σLdzL) (3.5)
Future over- (under -) funding at date T is assumed to accrue to (be paid by) the municipality’s taxpayers,
which in aggregate equals VT – LT . Assuming the population of representative taxpaying individuals at date
T is proportional to the value of date T liabilities, the representative taxpayer’s after tax wealth date T is
WT = W
p
T + λ
VT − LT
LT
= W pT + λ(GT − 1), (3.6)
where W pt is the taxpayer’s date t personal before-tax wealth and λ > 0 is the ratio of pension liabilities
per taxpayer. The larger is λ, the more sensitive is the taxpayer’s wealth to the pension plan’s funding
status. If taxpayers’ utilities display constant relative risk aversion with coefficient (1- γ) > 0, and pension
investment policy has the objective of maximizing their utility, then the pension fund’s asset allocation
problem is
Maxω(t)∀t∈[0,T ]E0
[(
W pT + λ(GT − 1)
γ
)γ]
(3.7)
subject to equation (3.5).
Consider the case where the taxpayer can invest her before-tax wealth, W pt , in the same securities available
to the pension fund so that it satisfies
dW pt /W
p
t =
n+1∑
i=1
ωpi,t (αidt+ σidzi) (3.8)
where αn+1 ≡ αL, σn+1 ≡ σL, dzn+1 ≡ dzL, and ωpi,t is the taxpayer’s portfolio weight in security i at
t. Since from equation (3.6) after-tax wealth is linear in W pT and GT , in a Modigliani-Miller world a given
pension fund allocation, ωt, determining the process for Gt in (3.5) could be offset (perfectly hedged) by
the taxpayer via her appropriate choice of personal portfolio weights ωpi,t in equation (3.8). In this case, the
pension fund’s portfolio choice, ωt, becomes irrelevant.
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However, as discussed earlier it is unrealistic that at each point in time a taxpayer is aware of the pension
funds’ investments, liabilities, and, in turn, the extent to which she will need to contribute via future taxation
to the fund. Poor pension accounting standards together with a lack of information means that that the
representative taxpayer is likely unaware of the risk faced by the pension funding ratio, Gt.
Consequently, the pension fund’s portfolio choice could expose the taxpayer to unhedged risk that reduces
her utility below that of a full information environment. In this more realistic setting, a strong case could be
made that the pension fund should be managed to eliminate its tracking error risk so that ωt= 0 and dGt =
0 ∀ t ∈ [0,T ]. If so, GT = G0 and the taxpayer can choose her personal portfolio weights, ωpi,t, to maximize
(3.7) with no uncertainty regarding the tax to be paid at T. Moreover, if the pension fund was fully-funded
at date 0, then GT = G0 =1 and the taxpayer faces no obligation at date T.
Might there be circumstances where pension funding risk could benefit taxpayers? If a significant portion
of taxpayers lack access to risky investments, pension tracking error risk could afford them this exposure.
Empirical evidence shows that individuals’ holdings of risky investments such as stocks has risen over time,
but significant proportions of the population continue to hold almost all of their financial assets in risk-free
investments such as bank deposits.6 If these risk-free investments are not chosen willingly but are due to high
costs of accessing risky assets, exposure to pension funding risk could potentially raise utility by generating
risk premia for taxpayers.
If we consider this case where W pT is risk-free, equal to a constant W¯
p, then the pension fund’s utility
maximizing proportion invested in the alternative security portfolio for any date t ∈ [0,T ] is
ω∗t =
αG
(1− γ)σ2G
(
1 +
W¯ p − λ
λGt
)
(3.9)
where αG ≡ αA − αL + σ2L − σAL and . Equation (3.9) says that when the risk premium αG is positive
(negative), the pension fund takes a long (short) position in the alternative securities.7 This deviating
position is tempered by the relative volatility of the alternative securities, σG, and the taxpayer’s relative
risk aversion, (1- γ).
Equation (3.9) indicates that the pension fund should change its allocation in the alternative securities
as its funding level, Gt, changes
∂|ω∗t |
∂Gt
= −(W¯ p − λ) |αG|
(1− γ)λG2tσ2G
(3.10)
6See, for example, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Campell (2006).
7It can be shown that the optimal portfolio choice ensures that
[
1 +
(
W¯ p − λ) / (λGt)] is always positive.
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This derivative is negative whenever W¯ p− λ is positive, so that when total taxpayer wealth unrelated to
pension funding is larger than total pension liabilities, declines in Gt raise |ω∗t |. This occurs because with
constant relative risk aversion, the individual’s utility is maximized when she holds constant fractions of
her wealth in risk-free and risky assets. When pension funding, and therefore after-tax wealth, rises, the
pension fund optimally lowers its allocation to the risky alternative securities to maintain a constant share
in risk-free assets.
Based on our earlier discussion, the model results for this case come with several caveats. First, the
representative taxpayer faces taxation risk not just from the municipality’s pension under-funding but from
other deficits/surpluses that may arise from the government’s other activities. Recognizing these other
sources of tax uncertainty in the individual’s wealth in equation (3.6) could motivate the pension fund to
hedge those risks. Second, the analysis ignores federal personal income taxes. Bader and Gold (2007) show
that to minimize federal income taxes, it is preferable for the pension fund to invest in high-taxed bonds and
for individuals to hold lower-taxed risky assets, such as equities, in their personal portfolios when possible.
Third, when the pension fund ends with a surplus (GT > 1), it may not accrue to the taxpayer. Political
pressure leads to a sharing of the surplus with public employees in the form of a reduction in employee
contributions or an increase in pension benefits.8 Thus, it may be illusory to believe that taxpayers benefit
by receiving the risk premia generated by pension investments.
These caveats cast doubt on an “activist” public pension fund investment strategy designed to provide
risk premia on behalf of investment-constrained taxpayers. Rather, these qualifications favor an optimal
investment policy that passively follows the liability immunizing strategy where ωt = 0 ∀ t. Such a strategy
would be transparent to taxpayers, allowing many of them to focus on their individual portfolios. It also
avoids generating surpluses that taxpayers would be forced to share with employees. In addition, since this
passive policy entails primarily fixed-income investments, it delivers federal tax savings.
Shifting from a normative to a positive theory of public pension investment behavior, note that the
practice of delegating pension fund management could lead to agency problems where the Board of Trustees
and staff maximize their own utility of wealth rather than that of a representative taxpayer. Since stated
objectives guiding pension plan investments often downplay the risk of pension liabilities, the Board and staff
may be judged against a alternative benchmark such as the investment performance of peer pension plans.
In this light, the wealth in equation (3.6) can be re-interpreted as that of the pension fund management
where the process followed by the benchmark Lt in (3.1) may be the average rate of return earned by
8This point is made by Peskin (2001), Bader and Gold (2007), Peng (2008) , among others.
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other public pension funds. If explicit or implicit (career concern) compensation is performance-related, the
pension Board and staff’s wealth will be linked to future relative performance, GT = VT /LT , measured as
the pension plan’s funding ratio or its investment performance relative to its peers.
Assuming that the fund managers’ wealth unrelated their pension performance is invested mainly in
risk-free assets and is sufficiently large (W¯ p − λ > 0), the solution for optimal portfolio choice continues to
satisfy equations (3.9) and (3.10): pension fund managers will increase the fund’s tracking error risk as their
relative performance declines. If their wealth that is unrelated to performance is low (W¯ p − λ < 0), the
pension fund’s management will decrease its tracking error risk as its performance declines.
The next sections examine the empirical evidence related to our model based on a time series and cross
section of state pension plans. We investigate how a state pension plan’s choice of tracking error volatility
relates to its characteristics, including the plan’s funding ratio, its performance relative to its peers, its
governance, and participants.
3.4 Data and Variable Construction
Our data on state pension funds comes from two sources. The first is Wilshire Associates who generously
provided us with an annual time series of investment information on 125 state pension funds over the 2000
to 2009 period.9 This data includes each fund’s actuarial values of liabilities and actuarial and market values
of assets for each of the ten years. For each year, it also gives every fund’s proportions of assets allocated
to eight categories: U.S. equities, non-U.S. equities, U.S. fixed income, non-U.S. fixed income, real estate,
private equity, hedge funds, and other. In addition, it includes each fund’s assumed rate for discounting
liabilities and the total payroll for active participants in the pension fund.
The second data source comes from the placePlaceNameBoston PlaceTypeCollege PlaceTypeCenter for
Retirement Research (CRR). This is publicly-available data on 112 state pension funds for the year 2006.10
It provides individual pension fund characteristics on governance, the type of plan participants (general
employees, teachers, or police and firefighters), and numbers of active members and annuitants.
Comparing the state pension funds in the Wilshire data to those in the CRR data led to 97 matches. We
selected from the CRR the following variables: the ratio of a pension fund’s Board members who are plan
participants to the total Board members of the pension fund; a dummy variable equaling 1 if the pension
9Due to late reporting, information on only 50 state funds is available for the year 2009.
10This data is at http://crr.bc.edu/frequently requested data/state and local pension data 4.html.
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fund had a separate investment council (zero otherwise); and a dummy variable equaling 1 if the contribution
rate of the pension fund sponsor was statutorily set (zero otherwise).
As previously mentioned, our measure of a pension fund’s overall asset - liability risk-taking is its tracking
error volatility. To translate a given pension fund’s asset-class allocations for a given year into this risk
measure, we collected for the period January 1997 to April 2010 monthly time series of asset returns in order
to estimate a covariance matrix of returns for seven different asset classes.11 The following asset return series
were chosen: U.S. equities – Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Institutional Fund; Non-U.S. equities –
Vanguard Total International Stock Index Fund; U.S. fixed income – Vanguard Total Bond Market Index
Institutional Fund; Non-U.S. fixed income – Barclays Capital Global Majors, Ex. U.S., Fixed-Income Index;
Real estate – Wilshire U.S. REIT Index; Hedge funds – Morningstar MSCI Composite Hedge Fund Returns;
and Private equity – Cambridge Associates U.S. Private Equity Returns.12 In addition, while not an asset
class specified in the Wilshire data, a part of our analysis of tracking error volatility will use a Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) return series, which we proxied by the Vanguard Inflation-Protected
Securities Institutional Fund.
Data on wage growth and returns on nominal and real (inflation-indexed) bonds were used to estimate the
variances of market returns on pension fund liabilities as well as these returns’ covariances with the different
asset classes. Wages were proxied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics quarterly Employment Cost Index for
State and Local Government Workers. For bonds, a monthly time series of 15-year maturity, zero-coupon
bond returns were constructed for nominal Treasuries and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS)
using the data of Grkaynak et al. (2007) and Grkaynak et al. (2008) .13 Nominal and real bonds having a
15-year maturity were chosen because several sources indicate that the typical pension fund’s liabilities have
a duration of that length.14
In our model, tracking error volatility was represented by the quantity |ωt|σG, which is mathematically
equivalent to the square root of the variance of the difference in the rates of return on pension assets (Vt)
and pension liabilities (Lt): σ
2
V + σ
2
L − 2ρV LσV σL. We estimated the variance of a pension fund’s assets in
a given year asσ2V = ω
′Ωω, where Ω is the estimated covariance matrix of returns for the seven asset classes
11One of the eight Wilshire asset classes is “Other.” Since it averaged only 1.9%, we ignored it when computing tracking
error volatility and proportionally increased the other asset class weights.
12Each asset return series is monthly except for the Cambridge Associates U.S. Private Equity Returns, which is quarterly.
We used the monthly series to estimate the covariance matrix of returns, except for those matrix elements relating to private
equity returns, which were estimated based on a quarterly returns.
13This Treasury and TIPS yield data is at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm. We converted the
monthly real returns on a 15-year TIPS to nominal ones using the Consumer Price Index.
14Ryan and Fabozzi (2002) state “an average 15.5 duration should be close to the median or average duration of the pension
industry.” Also, MercerLLC (2010) uses a 15-year duration for the average pension plan and states that a plan with a typical
mix of active members and retirees has a duration between 13 and 16 years.
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and ω is the 7×1 vector of the fund’s portfolio weights (allocations) in these seven asset classes.
As shown in the Appendix of Pennacchi and Rastad (2010), pension liabilities under a PBO measure
are composed of wage and bond risk, where the bond risk is either nominal or real (in the case of COLA
benefits). Thus, the standard deviation of pension liabilities, σL, can be computed from the estimated
standard deviations of wage growth (σLw ) and nominal or real bond returns σLp as well as their correlation
ρwp: σ
2
L = σ
2
Lw + σ
2
Lp + 2ρwpσLwσLp. We calculated this pension liability standard deviation, σL, assuming
that liabilities were either purely nominal or purely real liabilities. As detailed in this Appendix, we also
adjusted the standard deviations of wage growth and bond risk (duration) using the fund’s ratio of active
(employed) to total plan participants (including retirees). These adjustments led to the funds’ liabilities
reflecting different sensitivities to wage risk and different durations ranging from 6 to 20 years.
Because in practice pension funds may not view their liabilities as a benchmark but may benchmark their
performance to peer public pension funds, we created an additional tracking error volatility measure where,
instead of the liability volatilities just discussed, we set σ2L = ω
′
aΩωawhere ωa is a 7×1 vector of portfolio
allocations that are the averages across the 125 state funds for a particular year.
The last step in constructing tracking error volatility calculates the covariance between a fund’s chosen
assets and the selected liability/peer performance for a particular year:ρV LσV σL. The final measure of
tracking error volatility is the square root of σ2V + σ
2
L − 2ρV LσV σL.
Table 3.1 gives summary statistics for different asset class rates of return, as well as state and local
employee wage growth and returns on 15-year zero-coupon nominal and real bonds. It is the annualized
standard deviations and correlations from this table, which were calculated over the 1997 to 2010 period,
that we use to construct tracking error volatilities. Of particular interest is the estimated correlation of
-0.27 between state and local wage growth and U.S. equity returns. Prior research, including Black (1989) ,
Cardinale (2003) , Lucas and Zeldes (2006) and Lucas and Zeldes (2009) advocate pension fund investments
in equities as a way to hedge wage uncertainty under the presumption that equities and wages are positively
correlated.
A potential criticism of our negative wage-equity correlation estimate is that it is calculated over a quar-
terly holding period. Recommendations for using stocks to hedge wage growth assume that their correlation
is positive over a longer holding period. Models by Lucas and Zeldes (2006), Benzoni et al. (2007), and
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009) show that wage growth and stock returns can have zero short-run correlation
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but, due mean reversion, a correlation that approaches 1 over long horizons.15
As a check, we calculated wage-equity correlations, as well as wage-bond correlations, over longer holding
periods. Because the BLS state and local wage index only starts in 1981, we use the BLS national wage index
which starts in 1952. Equity returns are for the S&P 500 index or a small stock index and bond returns are
those for 10-year or 20-year maturity Treasury bonds.16
Panel A: Correlation between National Wage Index Growth and S& P500 Return
Holding Period Correlation Observations t-statistics p-value
one-year -0.0389 57 -0.2890 0.7737
five-year -0.4348 11 -1.4483 0.1815
nine-year -0.4406 6 -0.9816 0.3819
Panel B: Correlation between National Wage Index Growth and Small Firm Index Return
Holding Period Correlation Observations t-statistics p-value
one-year -0.0606 57 -0.4503 0.6543
five-year -0.0106 11 -0.0319 0.9753
nine-year -0.5626 6 -1.3611 0.2451
Panel C: Correlation between National Wage Index Growth and 20-year Treasury bond Return
Holding Period Correlation Observations t-statistics p-value
one-year -0.2163 57 -1.6427 0.1061
five-year -0.2645 11 -0.8228 0.4319
nine-year 0.2449 6 0.5053 0.6399
Panel D: Correlation between National Wage Index Growth and 10-year Treasury note Return
Holding Period Correlation Observations t-statistics p-value
one-year -0.1095 57 -0.8171 0.4174
five-year -0.0746 11 -0.2245 0.8274
nine-year 0.4752 6 1.0802 0.3408
Table 3.2: Correlations of Equity and Bond Returns with National Wage Growth, 1952- 2008:National
Wage Index is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The returns on the S&P 500 Index, the 10-year
Treasury note and the 20-year Treasury bond were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
Table 3.2 presents estimated wage – asset return correlations for holding periods from one year to nine
years. Panel A indicates little evidence of a positive correlation between wages and large firm stock returns,
and the correlation point estimates trend more negative as the holding period increases. Panel B shows the
same qualitative correlations hold for small firm stock returns. This pattern of correlations is consistent with
Jermann (1999) who estimates wage – stock correlations over the 1929 – 1996 period, finding correlation
point estimates that are negative at horizons from 7 to 17 years before turning positive. Since a typical
15In contrast, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) present theory and empirical evidence for a negative correlation between
innovations in human capital and financial asset returns that is counter to models such as Benzoni et al. (2007).
16The small stock index was obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website and represents returns on the smallest 30%
of stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The S&P500 and bond returns are from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP).
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pension fund’s duration of liabilities is about 15 years, stocks may not be the best hedge of wage risk.
Another asset class, possibly bonds, might be a better hedge. Panels C and D of Table 3.2 find a
correlation between wage growth and bond returns whose point estimates becomes more positive as the
holding period increases. Though none of the correlation estimates in Table 3.2 are statistically significant,
the evidence does not justify large equity investments for hedging wage risk at horizons relevant to a typical
pension fund.
Along with asset return and wage growth standard deviations and correlations, the final input in con-
structing tracking error volatilities is each pension fund’s asset allocations for each year. Table 3.3 gives
summary statistics of these allocations and the resulting tracking error volatilities calculated for different
benchmarks. Average volatilities are lower when the benchmark is real liabilities compared to nominal lia-
bilities. Unsurprisingly, with a benchmark equal to the average of funds’ allocations, average tracking error
volatilities are the least.
Table 3.3 also includes yearly averages for two variables that our model predicts may influence tracking
error volatility: the plan’s funding ratio and its investment return. The funding ratio is measured as the
market value of assets divided by the actuarial value of liabilities. The plan’s investment return in a given
year is estimated as the product of its asset-class allocation weights and the returns earned by each asset
class. The average funding ratio of these 125 state pension plans was highest at 109% during 2000 prior to
the technology stock decline and was at a minimum of 58% during 2009, largely due to an estimated 30%
investment loss in 2008.
3.5 Empirical Evidence
3.5.1 Tracking Error Minimizing Allocations and Alternative Portfolio
Allocations
As a prelude to examining how funds’ tracking error volatilities vary with their plan characteristics, we
first estimate the asset allocations that would minimize the typical fund’s tracking error volatility. We also
present estimates of allocations for the “alternative” security portfolio modeled in equation (3.9). These
allocations are for a plan having 15-year duration liabilities and a sensitivity to wages reflecting a ratio of
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active participants to total participants of 66.57%, which is our sample average. Calculating allocations for
both portfolios employ the estimated covariance matrix for the asset classes’ returns as well as these returns’
covariances with wages and the 15-year maturity bonds. To calculate the alternative portfolio allocations
also requires estimates of the assets’ expected returns which are taken from Table 3.1.17
Table 3.4 gives the portfolio allocations that best hedge (immunize) this typical pension fund’s liabilities.18
Columns 1, 2, and 3 show results when the pension fund’s liabilities are purely nominal, having no COLAs.
In column 1, the unconstrained allocation that minimizes tracking error volatility calls for a 9% short position
in U.S. equities, a 160% allocation to U.S. fixed income, a 24% allocation to private equity, and a 67% short
position in hedge funds. The huge allocation to U.S. fixed income is partly explained by our assumption that
the pension funds’ fixed-income investments are of lower duration (lower interest rate sensitivity) than the
15-year duration of the pension funds’ nominal liabilities.19 These allocations imply that the fund should
borrow via short positions in other asset categories in order to increase its U.S. fixed income investment,
thereby raising its asset interest sensitivity. If, instead, the pension fund’s U.S. fixed income portfolio was
assumed to take the form of 15-year zero-coupon bonds, then its tracking error minimizing allocation would
be approximately 100%, rather than 160%, in U.S. fixed income.20
Because a short position in hedge fund investments is infeasible and a large allocation to private equity
may be unrealistic, column 2 of Table 3.4 shows the volatility minimizing allocation without private equity
or hedge fund investments. There the allocation to fixed income becomes 136%, with a 13% short position in
U.S. equities and a 17% short position in non-U.S. fixed income. Column 3 reports immunizing allocations
when short sales are not permitted. Interestingly, the allocation is 100% in fixed-income.
Columns 5 to 9 of Table 3.4 assume that the pension fund’s liabilities are fully inflation-indexed, real
liabilities. Given the widespread presence of COLAs in state and local pension benefits, this case may be most
realistic. Though the Wilshire data do not specifically identify funds’ allocation to inflation-indexed bonds
17Expected returns were estimated as the means in Table 3.1 except for U.S. Equities and U.S. Fixed Income where we
used estimates of 0.0742 and 0.0520, respectively, which are the average of forecasts over the 1997 to 2010 period from the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters. See http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-
forecasters/.
18The tracking error minimizing weights are given by ω∗ = Ω−1Ψ− κΩ−11 where Ω is the 7× 7 covariance matrix of asset
returns and Ψ is a 7×2 vector of covariances between the asset returns and pension liabilities (wage and nominal or real bond),
1 is a 7× 1 vector of ones, and κ ≡ (1′Ω−1Ψ− 1) / (1′Ω−11).
19Table 3.1 shows that the annualized standard deviation of U.S. Fixed Income returns is 0.0885 while that of the 15-year
nominal bond is 0.1376, implying that the duration of the pension funds’ U.S. fixed-income investments is approximately
15 × (0.0885/0.1376) = 9.6 years. Adams and Smith (2009) believe that the typical pension funds’ fixed income investments
are of a lower duration than that of their liabilities.
20This ignores the desire to hedge the wage risk of liabilities. The allocation might exceed 100% given the positive bond
return - wage growth correlation.
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(they would likely be included in U.S. fixed income), we consider allocations with and without including
TIPS. When TIPS are included, column 5 shows that the immunizing allocation is 139% in TIPS with a
large short position in private equity. If, as in column 6, private equity and hedge fund investments are
disallowed, the TIPS allocation becomes 101%. Column 7 reports allocations when TIPS are excluded. The
allocation to U.S. fixed income becomes 60% and the allocation to non-U.S. fixed income is a large 18%.
Moreover, the allocation to hedge funds switches signs, to a large 38% allocation financed with a 20% short
position in private equity.
In column 8, the allocation that excludes TIPS and short sales calls for U.S. and foreign fixed income
allocations of 70% and 21%, respectively, with an 8% allocation to hedge funds. The sizable position in foreign
fixed income makes sense since it should hedge U.S. inflation if exchange rates adjust with purchasing power
parity. Column 9 permits investments in TIPS but no short positions. The result is a simple 86% allocation
to TIPS and a 14% allocation to U.S. fixed-income.
Columns 4 and 10 of Table 3.4 give the “alternative security” portfolio allocations corresponding to
the multivariate analog of the quantity αG/σ
2
Gin equation (3.9).
21 Unlike the tracking error minimizing
portfolio, the alternative security portfolio depends on the asset classes’ expected returns which are difficult
to estimate accurately (Merton (1980)). Hence, these estimated alternative portfolio weights should be
interpreted cautiously. Column 4 shows that when the pension fund wishes to generate risk premia on behalf
of the representative taxpayer and liabilities are nominal, the pension fund will start from its tracking error
minimizing portfolio in column (3.1) and move in the direction of eliminating its long position in U.S. fixed
income, short foreign equities, and investing primarily in hedge funds, non-U.S. fixed income, private equity.
Equation (3.9) indicates the extent of this deviation from the immunizing portfolio will be inversely related
to risk-aversion and pension funding.
When liabilities are real, column (3.10) indicates that generating risk premia leads the pension fund to
undo its large TIPS position shown in column (3.5) and, similar to the nominal liability case, short foreign
equities, and allocate more to private equity, hedge funds, and foreign fixed income. Note from the last row
in Table 3.4 that such a deviation generates an excess return of approximately 0.160 – 0.044 = 11.6%.
Finally, note from the second to last row of Table 3.4, the minimum tracking error volatilities for both
nominal and real liabilities are much lower than the average tracking error volatilities estimated in Table
21The formula for these allocations is given by equation (A-7) in Chen and Pennacchi (2009).
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Tracking Error Volatilities
3.3 for our sample of state pension funds. Figure 3.2 explores this point further by plotting the sample
distribution of tracking error volatilities. It graphs, for each fund during each year, the volatility of tracking
error relative to the fund’s real liabilities (horizontal axis) versus the fund’s volatility of tracking error relative
to its peers (vertical axis). The distribution appears skewed, with only a few pension funds (primarily those
with very high allocations to U.S. fixed-income) choosing allocations that immunize real liabilities. The
vast majority of pension funds’ allocations result in peer tracking error volatilities below 4%, indicating a
tendency to herd far from an immunizing portfolio.
3.5.2 Tracking Error Volatility and Plan Characteristics
Let us now investigate the relationship between a fund’s characteristics and its choice of tracking error
volatility based on the following linear regression model:
σTE,i,t = β1 × (Funding ratio)t−1 + β2 × (Return relative to peers)t−1
+ β3 × (Governance variables) + β4 × (Other Control variables) + εit
(3.11)
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where σTE,i,t is the tracking error volatility of fund i in year t. Under the normative view that the
pension fund should maximize the utility of a representative taxpayer, our model predicts different relation-
ships between tracking error and pension funding under different assumptions. As discussed earlier, if the
representative taxpayer is able to invest in the same asset classes available to the pension fund, utility is
maximized if the fund simply minimizes tracking error volatility, implying no relationship between tracking
error volatility and the plan’s funding ratio (β1 = 0). Alternatively, if the representative taxpayer has access
only to risk-free investments, utility maximization could imply that tracking error declines with the plan’s
funding ratio (β1 < 0).
Under the positive theory that the pension fund is managed to maximize the utility of wealth of the
pension Board and staff, and their benchmark for compensation includes the “traditional” one of return
performance relative to the fund’s peers, then tracking error volatility may vary with the fund’s past invest-
ment return. In particular, if the personal wealth of the pension Board and staff is primarily in risk-free
investments whose value is large relative to their management compensation (W¯ p − λ > 0), then tracking
error risk should be high following a poor relative return (β2 < 0). Conversely, if the compensation of the
Board and staff is large relative their personal wealth (W¯ p−λ < 0) or, as may seem reasonable, their personal
wealth is invested in primarily risky assets, then they may optimally lower tracking error risk following a
poor relative return (β2 > 0).
The regression includes additional explanatory variables listed in Table 3.5. These include governance-
related variables, controls related to the type of participants, and other characteristics such as a proxy for
fund size (the natural log of the market value of pension assets), the ratio of payroll to pension liabilities,
and the rate chosen by the fund to discount its liabilities. We include the fund’s chosen discount rate, not
because it is an exogenous variable, but to explore whether tracking error risk is linked to a possible motive
to underreport liabilities via a higher discount rate.
Table 3.6 reports results of equation (3.11). Each regression specification controls for time (year) fixed-
effects. In columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, the regressions include time-invariant fund characteristics from the
CRR dataset, so our observations drop to 97 pension plans per year. In columns 2, 6, and 10 we exclude
the CRR data but control for fund fixed-effects, in which case the observations equal 125 pension plans per
year. Columns 4 and 8 run regressions of equation (3.11) in first differences (annual changes) for all of the
variables.
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables;
Tracking Error Volatility Benchmarked on:
Nominal Liabilities 903 0.1712 0.0209 0.0746 0.2163
Real Liabilities 903 0.1380 0.0154 0.0741 0.1734
Average Asset Allocation of Peers 1121 0.0171 0.0132 0.0026 0.1294
Portfolio Share:
of Total Equity 1121 0.5839 0.0995 0 0.8254
of US Equity 1121 0.4244 0.1029 0 0.7945
Not Invested in US Fixed Income 1121 0.6988 0.1131 0 0.8971
Primary Explanatory Variables:
Funding Ratio 1121 0.8528 0.1970 0.1908 1.7520
Return on Investments 1121 0.0345 0.1463 -0.3891 0.2529
Governance Variables:
Participants to Total Board Members 921 0.5646 0.2227 0 1
Dummy for Separate Investment Council 930 0.3839 0.4866 0 1
Dummy for Legal Restrictions 930 0.3086 0.4622 0 1
Other Control Variables:
Natural log of Market Value of Assets 1121 22.6602 1.3605 19.2661 26.2487
Payroll to Actuarial Liabilities 1121 0.2360 0.2029 0.0085 2.6248
Discount Rate 1121 0.0801 0.0039 0.07 0.09
Dummy for Teachers Fund 930 0.5065 0.5002 0 1
Dummy for General State Fund 930 0.6226 0.4850 0 1
Dummy for Police and Fire Fighters Fund 930 0.4441 0.4971 0 1
Table 3.5: Regression Variable Summary Statistics
The results in Table 3.6 do differ little when the dependent variable, tracking error volatility, is based on
a nominal or real pension liability benchmark. As shown in columns 1 to 8, three explanatory variables are
always statistically significant: the prior year’s investment return relative to peers; the fund’s chosen rate
used to discount liabilities; and the proportion of members of the Board of Trustees who are participants.
In addition, columns 2 and 6 indicate that the prior year’s funding ratio is significant when the larger 125
plan sample, estimated with fund fixed effects, is used. Notably, prior returns and the discount rate remain
significant when the regressions are in changes.
The negative coefficients on the fund’s prior-year return and its funding ratio might be interpreted as
risk-shifting behavior counter to a policy of pure immunization but consistent with a policy that generates
risk premia for taxpayers as in equation (3.9). However, the positive relationship between a fund’s chosen
rate to discount liabilities and its tracking error volatility indicates possible moral hazard on the part of
pension fund management.22 According to GASB standards, funds with higher tracking error volatility may
justify a higher discount rate because they are investing in assets with higher systematic (priced) risks. Or,
22That funds choosing higher discount rates also choose higher tracking error volatility is consistent with Park (2009) who finds
that public plans selecting higher discount rates are more likely to invest in real estate and alternative investments (including
private equity and hedge funds).
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it may be that a fund is motivated to select a higher discount rate to understate its liabilities and fictitiously
increase its net worth, thereby justifying greater tracking error risk. Since the direction of causality is unclear
and the chosen discount rate may be endogenous, regressions reported in columns 3 and 7 exclude it. Doing
so does not qualitatively change the results.
The finding that a fund takes more tracking error risk when it has greater participant representation on
its Board of Trustees might be explained in a couple of ways. If pension participants are less financially
literate than typical Board members, they may be less able to select asset allocations that immunize the
plan’s liabilities. Alternatively, participants may intentionally take more tracking error risk to increase the
likelihood of a significant pension surplus that will accrue to them in the form of increased benefits or lower
employee contribution rates.
Columns 9 and 10 report regression results where the benchmark is the average investment allocation by
peer pension plans. The estimated coefficients tend to be qualitatively different from the previous regressions
where a liability benchmark was used. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the plan’s
prior-year funding ratio and prior investment return indicate that pension funds deviate more from their
peers following better performance. Such behavior would be consistent with the positive theory that the
pension fund Board and staff maximize their own utility and their compensation is large relative their
personal wealth or their personal wealth is invested in primarily risky assets.
The finding that better-performing pension funds increase their tracking error relative to the average
allocation of other funds is not inconsistent with the previous regression results. Figure 3.2 shows that peer
and liability benchmarks are quite different, so when better-performing funds deviate more from their peers
they move closer to an immunizing portfolio. In other words, a poorly-performing pension fund reduces the
hedging of its liabilities and gambles by choosing a riskier portfolio more typical of its peers.
To explore whether our results are sensitive to using tracking error as a measure of a fund’s deviation
from an immunization benchmark, we consider three other dependent variables that proxy for deviations
from a fixed-income immunization strategy. These are a fund’s allocation to: equities; U.S. equities; or
all asset classes except fixed income. The results using these alternative dependent variables are shown in
columns 11 to 13 of Table 3.6. Compared to using tracking error benchmarked on nominal or real liabilities,
the qualitative results are unchanged.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper introduced a model of public pension fund asset allocation that can be a normative guide for
choosing pension investments or a positive theory of pension managerial behavior. It concludes that hedging
risk from changes in the market value of the pension fund’s liabilities is likely to be the socially optimal
policy. However, career concerns of pension fund managers may conflict with this objective. Our empirical
results seem consistent with such managerial agency behavior. We find that a public pension fund’s Board
of Trustees and staff tend to allocate assets based on the performance of peer pension funds rather than with
the aim of immunizing the plan’s liabilities.
Our empirical analysis of 125 state pension plans over the 2000-2009 period finds that a fund tends to
take more asset - liability “tracking error” risk following declines in its relative performance. Tracking error
volatility also is higher for pension funds that select a high rate with which to discount their liabilities and
pension funds that have a greater proportion of participants on their Boards of Trustees.
The portfolio choices of public pension plans that deviate substantially from the liability immunizing
strategies may be encouraged by opaque and misleading accounting standards that are divorced from finance
theory. Such standards may lead public plans to follow their “traditional” investment strategies of choosing
investments with little regard to their true liability risks. The pension fund asset-liability mismatches
resulting from these strategies pose a potential burden to taxpayers that will be realized then economic
conditions decline and when losses are most difficult to bear.
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